The Resistance in operational and civilian perspectives
...Which role in light of the problematic issues of unity & division inside Lebanon`s situation?
By: Ali Fayyad Chairman of Consultation Center for Research and Documentation
summary: This approach is an attempt to scientifically and precisely picture the resistance`s operational status and its relationship with the Lebanese political and social tissue or
environment with its internal and external complications. I seek in this approach, particularly in its first part, to lean on facts and figures, as I have firm faith that generalization deludes the truth. In the second part, I attempt to tackle profoundly what I see as intrinsic the Lebanese political sociological complication in relation with the resistance...to all this I am impelled by an inclination to converse, interact, and to forthrightly confront what we must.
First: participation of youth in operational resistance: a glance at the ages of the martyrs on the path of the resistance`s operations allows us to go past the obstacles hindering a study of the resistance`s human structure.
In this sense, statistics of the ages of martyrs between `93 and `97 assists in shedding light on the participation of youth in resistance.
Youngest Eldest Average
`93 19 33 22.7
`94 17 28 22.1
`95 18 35 23.4
`96 18 35 22.5
`97 18 38 25
It`s evident from the implications of the previous figures that the fighter structure is a youthful one, which is quite natural. The averages also demonstrate that the majority is in the 20`s; those older or younger are mere exceptions.
The rise in age of the elder martyrs in year `97 is generally balanced and in harmony with the natural position occupied by the resistance and the rise of its rank in Lebanese political and social interest.
Second: The operational status of the resistance: Four indications may be used to know well the operational status of the resistance: the number of resistance operations, enemy loses, number of resistance martyrs, and quality of operations.
A- An appraisal of annual rates of resistance operations reveals an increasing inclination of these operations. The average rate of operations between `89 and `91 was 292 operations while the average between `92 and `94 was 465 operations. Meanwhile, in the last three years, `95-`97, it reached 936 operations whereas 736 of the operations were by the Islamic Resistance alone. These averages indicate quantitative development in the resistance`s work and that it has gained impulse in spite of the fact that the confrontation circumstances and intensive enemy arrangements have both become complicated.
B- Enemy Loses: According to enemy sources, the enemy`s overall casualties (dead and wounded "Israelis" and Lahd militia members) reveal a general rising inclination. Hence, annual rate of enemy casualties from `92 to `94 was 154, whereas in the last three years it reached 256. These rates suggest that the resistance`s operations are efficient enough to surpass the goal of preoccupying and perplexing the enemy to achieve quality results in terms of enemy casualties.
C- Resistance Martyrs: Resistance martyr rates generally indicate a rising inclination. The increase itself is applicable to the Islamic Resistance if taken alone as they are the professional fighting structure of resistance work... this seems natural in regards of the vast increase of the number of operations, and based on the development of operational facts in the confrontation, its intensity, and the complications of its techniques and tactics. It`s unmistakable that the main significance of the rise in the number of martyrs coupled with the increase of number of operations is an escalation of the resistance`s level, insisting on keeping the fire blazing to accomplish the aspired goals. So between `95 and `97 the resistance martyr rate reached 71 whereas it was 26 between `89 and `91, and 35 between `92 and `94, as well as 50 between `95 and `97.
D- Quality of Operations: The operations of the resistance are divided among ambushes, bombs, attacks, shelling, martyrdom operations, Katyusha bombing, direct confrontations, and sniping. In the resistance`s considerations these tools may be considered traditional excepting martyrdom operations and Katyusha missiles (strictly defensive weapon) which could be considered strategic weapons.
It`s also evident that with the development of The Islamic Resistance`s operational performance and with the experience-accumulation of its planners and fighters, the focus was centered on the smart-bomb war. The "Israelis" declare that they undergo a daily brain war and relate it to the resistance`s intelligence superiority, the matter which aided the latter to execute security operations in the heart of the occupied belt, targeting convoys of high rank enemy officers, and deactivating its elite operations such as the Ansaryiah operation where almost all infiltrating commandos were eradicated.
In addition, there is focus on semi-daily pinpoint shelling of enemy posts rendering them efficient-paralyzed. Add to that the high-level surprise factor causing casualties in enemy lines.
Last but not least, the resistance videotaped its operations inserting a new form of weapons in the war which succeeded in multiplying the psychological effect of operations, according to "Israeli" sources.
Third: Results and Implications: The previous indications confirm the resistance`s success and development of methods quantatively and qualitatively. Due to the accumulation of its tactical achievements, it was capable of attaining results with strategic dimensions. This is applicable on certain turning points and events, and results demonstrating the resistance`s work outside the traditional borders of confrontation. Take the July and April understandings and wars as examples...as well as the Dabsheh operation, the Ansaryieh battle, the "Israeli"-conditioned acknowledgement of the resolution 425... shattering the `invincible army` image. Also, consider the leading model of the resistance in the current Arab awareness in a time of defeat and unbalance of powers, and the transformation of the resistance into a main element in the regional balance of the Arab-"Israeli" conflict.
This resistance which proved its ability to renovate itself and pump up its sixteen-year-old journey with life and vitality seems to have just begun the journey unaffected by weakness or infirmity, while on the other side, the enemy is in the pits in need of targets and incentives; the psychological environment of its army is come over by symptoms of depression and anxiety. At present, in the prospects of the confrontation in the South, the Lebanese state surpasses the "Israeli" state psychologically; another excellence of Lebanese over "Israelis" exists in the system of values and incentives ruling the confrontation. As well, the confrontation-dichotomies are those of Lebanese pride and "Israeli" defeat: martyrdom - gratis death / liberation-occupation / Jihad - futile war / the land of steadfastness and heroism - Lebanese swamp and Lebanese curse / Heroes of resistance - depressed army. There is a complete lexicon of defeat and dilemma used by "Israeli" officials, observers, and analysts.
Example:
Self-confidence has vanished [Maariv 16-7-1996]
The security belt has for long been converted into a non-security belt [Haaretz 9-2-1997]
We have tied ourselves to our own tails; we are a defeated victim; Our soldiers are dummies in a gunfield [ Avigdor Kahlani 7-1-1997]
What has emerged now is akin to a balance of terror inclining to Hizbullah`s advantage [Israel TV 31-3-1997]
Our relationship with Lahd militia resembles that of soccer coaches that beg their over-paid losing player to hold on [Maareif 10-7-1997]
In addition to that is the outstanding internal-political frame of conflict. On one hand, there is a united official and public Lebanese stand considering the resistance an overwhelming national option which consequently became the pillar of the national stand facing southern and regional developments. On the other hand, there exists an internal social-political drift affecting even the military establishment opening the doors wide to a debate on the benefit of staying in South Lebanon.
What surpasses in the end is the ideology of confrontation or the ideology of conflict.
Fourth: National Steadfastness: The discourse on steadfastness diverges in two directions; the first relating to the concrete resistance of steadfastness while the other to the intellectual-political environment which creates a general conceptual frame for popular attitude. Both directions meet at the question of what the Lebanese civil society`s status is in the latter`s relationship with the resistance. (an issue to be discussed shortly)
It`s a grave mistake to limit the meaning of resistance to the military dimension alone even if the latter is its summit and profound expression, reducing it far from its ample significance. The military arm is in need of a body to nourish it and an environment to provide it with protection and a vital atmosphere... This is why the national steadfastness becomes the pillar of the resistance`s movement and the base of its natural continuance. Furthermore, national steadfastness becomes ailing upon division, sectarianism or partisanship, due to the fact that its vital dimension lies in its propagation and leaning on a base with multiple pillars - materialistic, national, and religious.
While the materialistic constituents seem to be a vital and utterly important need to nourish popular attitude with the capacity to go on firmly, the issue which is applied by the Islamic Resistance`s civil institutions such as building houses, treating the wounded, taking liberated captives under their wing as well as the families of martyrs, aside to the efforts of specialized government institutions; nevertheless, all the former is insufficient compared with the daily material and human attrition inflicted by the enemy.
And in spite of this insufficiency, the level of steadfastness our people demonstrate is a source of satisfaction and pride...of which the April war in 1996 is a rich example.
Based on this, it can be said that the pillar and main base of steadfastness is our people`s faith in the issue of resisting the occupier and liberating their land, and their readiness to sacrifice for this issue.
Some principal factors secured a favorable environment for steadfastness.... Among which are the resistance`s credibility, the feeling that liberation is possible and around the corner, the unity of official and popular stands, and the deep sympathy of other districts with the South and confrontation zones.
Nevertheless, the resistance`s morals and mottos, the mixing of both religious and national dimensions of the resistance, and the sacrifices...all gave national steadfastness and the capacity of southerners to bear the costs and pains of confrontation a deeper-rooted vaster meaning. Pain and sacrifice were spiritually and morally identified with the religious symbols. Sacrifice and firmness became a Husaini value; in this sense it becomes victory in all cases and an optimistic value regardless of outcomes: liberation or martyrdom.
It reflects a prevailing mood; the deep sorrow rooted in worldly meaning seems transitory in the perspective of existence... a path to unbounded happiness and tranquility.
It`s evident that the psychological structure of the popular steadfastness is a strong one constituting a valuable firm basis for this steadfastness. It is worth noting the shameful failure of the Lebanese state in laying down a comprehensive steadfastness strategy for our people in the occupied zone on the levels of development, services, education, and politics...to develop the state of the present reluctance which reached advanced levels in the past years. It may be necessary to institutionalize this concern and convert it into a national comprehensive concern.
In a nutshell, the current state of the South in the battle for liberation or even the future state in light of constant "Israeli" threats should be made economically and developmentally institutionalized for its particular position, the requirements of constant protection, and deep-rooted public steadfastness.
The resistance society has been proclaimed time and again, yet what is intended is to disown specialization of resistance to a professional fighting fraction alone... It is inevitable to lay on society as a whole the responsibility of confrontation, each person from his or her own position, and civil or military role. The steadfastness society is a minimum state required in Lebanon at the present and in the future, and its various requirements should necessarily be provided.
Fifth: Which role does the resistance take in view of partition-union problematic issue in the Lebanese state?
Similar to the issues in the Lebanese sociological state which is rapidly penetrated by its problems and complications, and which is destined, for structural reasons, to digestion and inclusion in a certain area`s sectarian and political logic... the resistance has undergone same attempts of subjection. Therefore, a question is raised: Which is the resistance`s position in light of the union-partition problem in the Lebanese situation?
It`s clear that the resistance`s positive position in the Lebanese society and politics is evident. Going back the mid and late 80`s when the resistance and its operations were surrounded with disputes and up`s and down`s, and the resistance was hemmed in the corner...all quickly starting to disintegrate in the early 90`s due to the resistance`s efficiency, success, sacrifices... and the development of the official Lebanese position, enlargement of the Lebanese popular sphere of comprise of the resistance, and the stumbling of the plan of settlement in later stages.
In the current stage, the resistance gains a semi-national unanimity appearing to be an inevitable option to liberate land and to reinforce the Lebanese position which lacks pressure cards facing the enemy. In this sense, the resistance, seems to have hit some luck in its newer stage as it was able to escape the Lebanese partition mechanisms the production of which deepens the roots of an unbalanced political regime and an ever more disordered authority.
This partition extends to reach the appointment of employees as much as it does in the assignment of government ¬¬policies and thanks due to God that it has not reached the option of liberation and embracing the resistance for the time being. On the contrary, the resistance formed at certain drastic turning points a uniting entrance awakening to the maximum limits the sense of national identity and affiliation. (Quana, Operation of Accountability, the Grapes of Wrath war, the martyrdom of the son of secretary general of Hizbullah)
The seed of internal partition comes from narrow-minded, sectarian and personal conflicting.
According to the experience gained in the past few years, and in light of balances and nature of the Lebanese social-political situation, never was the resistance a path to power or government nor a means of prestigious unilateral benefit. Rather, it was a path leading to people`s hearts.
And in this may lay a chief characteristic of the resistance`s eminence and its human and national invulnerability, i.e. keeping away from internal political employment which is a dead-end maze.
If we take this for granted among the different political powers and trends, it contributes to exalting the resistance so that it is dealt with as a unifying national alternative above all futile disputes and divisions. Subsequently, regardless of the resisting side, the core problematic question goes from the divisional circle to the unifying circle, and its form switches from `who is he that resists` to `who resists` where the difference is evident; the first relates to the doer while the latter relates to the action.
In a word, I announce: Let`s resist, for whatever the ideological or political position of those who resist, the revenues of the resistance will gather amount in the nation`s benefit and for its sake.
Three problematic issues arise with the resistance`s relationship with the social-political frame on a national level: an issue in the relationship with the government, another in the relationship with the political and sectarian diverse Lebanese mixture, and a third in generalizing and expanding the resistance. These problematic issues surface as challenges entrusted with the resistance`s stability as a national comprehensive project.
It`s evident that the problematic issue of the relationship with the government has been straightened up and anchored at a fixed political balance and operational collaboration in vital domains; nevertheless, the government is called upon to carry on its positive practice beyond political and security fields to other social domains needed on the southern front which is the operational field of the resistance`s movement.
Regarding the problematic issue of the relationship with sectarian and political Lebanese formation, there exist several positive developments [The April war, and the martyrdom of the son of Hizbullah`s secretary general were its leading turning points] which lead to advanced progression, thus, opening doors to communication and interaction and leading to an atmosphere of common trust. Yet what should be reached is the establishment of relations of powers, trends, and sects with the resistance (in particular with the party that carries the main burden of resistance), that is, with the Islamic Resistance on the grounds of achievements and role, not on the basis of intellectual and political purport which appears as ideological and mobilization characteristic that should be spontaneously comprised by the Lebanese variety with no sensitivity or aversion.
As to the third problematic issue - that of generalizing the resistance, expanding its sphere, and working on comprising all actual Lebanese fractions and variety - the resistance has practically strived to resolve it through the "Lebanese Battalions for the Resistance of "Israeli" Occupation". We believe this project which has proved preliminarily successful is capable of providing a sound frame for comprehensive national resistance, even if it is too early to subject this experiment to evaluation and judgment.
