July War Cables-Murr: We Confiscated Hizbullah Missiles, Refused to Give Them Back
DEFENSE MINISTER MURR CONFIDENT IN RAPID LAF DEPLOYMENT
id: 74004
date: 8/8/2006 5:25
refid: 06BEIRUT2553
origin: Embassy Beirut
classification: CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO3413
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLB #2553/01 2200525
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 080525Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4939
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0035
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0915
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 002553
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2016
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, PTER, LE, IS, SY
SUBJECT: TFLE01: DEFENSE MINISTER MURR CONFIDENT IN RAPID
LAF DEPLOYMENT
Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section 1.4 (d
).
SUMMARY
--------
1. (C) During an August 7 meeting with the Ambassador and
TDY poloff (notetaker), Lebanese Defense Minister Elias Murr
confidently claimed that 15000 LAF troops, if called upon,
could begin deploying to the South within 12 hours. (Note:
this meeting took place before the cabinet decision
authorizing deployment of that number after a full Israeli
withdrawal. End note.) Following this deployment, the LAF
would require assistance from the Arab countries,
particularly Saudi Arabia, in the provision of additional
equipment to support their permanent presence in the South.
Murr stated clearly that the LAF was prepared to hit back at
Hizballah if they attempted to fire at Israel or tried to
draw Israeli fire by placing launchers near to LAF positions.
Turning to the draft UNSC resolution, Murr cautioned that
without a clear solution to the Sheba'a Farms issue, the GOL
would not be able to undercut Hizballah's pretext for
remaining in the South and would therefore have a much harder
time dislodging them. Murr also supported the idea of a
beefed-up UNIFIL with a close coordination mechanism - such
as a Joint Operations Room (long a demand of the
international community) - for quickly passing messages
between the LAF and IDF. End Summary.
ASSESSING THE CURRENT CONFLICT
------------------------------
2. (C) In contrast to his earlier dismissals that Israel
had significantly harmed Hizballah, Murr claimed that
Hizballah had suffered losses of 50 percent of its equipment
as well as 400 fighters during the conflict. While he
estimates that Hizballah has fired off 3000 of its rockets,
he believes that the Syrians were able to resupply Hizballah
with 2500 before the Israelis took out the road links. Murr
believes that the time for a cease-fire is now. The Israelis
will find it much harder to pick off individual rocket
emplacements hidden in towns and villages without causing
significant civilian casualties and more international
uproar. Furthermore, according to Murr, the entire Lebanese
populace, including the Shi'a, are tired of the conflict and
want a cease-fire. This works to the advantage of the
cease-fire actually holding.
3. (C) As to the potential for an escalation of the
conflict, such as a Hizballah attack on Tel Aviv, Murr does
not see that as likely. Murr said that the decision to
strike Tel Aviv with Zilzal 1 and Zilzal 2 missiles would
have to come from Tehran. Israel would have to strike
downtown Beirut, which Murr thinks will not happen. When
asked whether Hizballah might cynically move a rocket
launcher into Solidere in order to draw Israeli aerial fire,
Murr dismissed this as "impossible." Saying that he had 3000
LAF troops stationed in Beirut, Murr scoffed, "Hizballah
cannot launch a rocket from Solidere. I have too many
soldiers there." He also claimed that three days ago the LAF
successfully interdicted a Hizballah-bound container of
rockets and impounded them in the Ministry of Defense,
refusing to release them to Hizballah.
"COUNT ON ME FOR THE DEPLOYMENT"
--------------------------------
4. (C) When asked about the LAF's ability to deploy to the
South, Murr replied that he could have 15,000 troops begin
deployment to seven sectors in the South within 12 hours of a
ceasefire. Pulling out a rough map, Murr elaborated on the
troop deployment numbers in the various sectors (Note. These
geographic sectors are estimates based on a quick glimpse at
the map. End Note.):
2,500 troops southwest of the Litani to the Blue Line ( 60
M48 tanks)
2,500 southeast of the Litani to the Blue Line ( 60 M48 tanks)
2,000 northwest of the Litani up to Sidon ( 60 M48 tanks)
2,000 northeast of the Litani around An-Nabatiyeh ( 60 M48
tanks)
- These two sectors would be augmented by another 1000 troops
BEIRUT 00002553 002 OF 002
already stationed just to the north of them.
2,000 north of the Blue Line roughly above Sheba'a Farms
2,000 north of that sector on the other side of Jabal Bi'r
ad-Dahr
1,000 northeast of those sectors
5. (C) Murr said that he planned to recall 12,000
reservists (something announced in the Lebanese press on
8/7), which he said would take 12 days, and to cancel all
leave for the entire army of 43,000. He added that the LAF,
once deployed, will need to receive additional equipment and
support from Arab nations, particularly Saudi Arabia, and
that he would need U.S. assistance in making that request.
"With a push from you, we can get from the Arab countries the
equipment that we need."
6. (C) Murr did not mention whether or not the LAF would
assume Hizballah's weapons and positions in the South. When
asked if he really thinks Hizballah will peacably accept this
arrangement, Murr challenged, "Let them play with the
Lebanese army. When we're in the South, anyone who moves,
we'll shoot at. No joke." He also thinks that Nabih Berri
will have to accept this plan, thereby providing at least
some Shi'a buy-in. Murr urged though that the international
community support this endeavour by providing a clear answer
on the Sheba'a Farms issue, thereby weakening Hizballah's
pretext for continuing the resistance. "With a political
agreement, no more resistance."
7. (C) Responding to the suggestion that the Israelis will
be skeptical as to the LAF's ability to assume security in
the South, Murr said that he supports the idea of a beefed-up
UNIFIL lending assistance to the LAF mission. He agrees with
establishing a joint operations room with UNIFIL in order to
quickly transmit messages to the IDF in the event of a
Hizballah attack launched from the South, with an eye to also
forestalling an Israeli response which might take out LAF
positions. When asked, Murr said he supports having UNIFIL
or UNTSO monitor points of entry, including ports and
airports, in order to reassure the Israelis that Hizballah
will not be resupplied.
COMMENT
-------
8. (C/NF) This meeting with Murr took place just a few
hours before the cabinet took its historic decision to deploy
15,000 troops to the south upon Israeli withdrawal behind the
Blue Line -- a decision that, had it occurred any time before
Hizballah's July 12 hijacking operation -- would have been
hailed by the international community. From the maps and
files Murr had, planning was already well underway for this
potential deployment before the cabinet decision. The fact
that the cabinet unanimously approved this proposal, with
little debate, indicates that Hizballah is fully on board.
Hizballah's acquiescence in a deployment that it had
strenuously opposed since the Israeli withdrawal from the
south in May 2000 suggests that Hizballah is now ready for a
cease-fire. If we can use this cabinet decision (and other
steps) to encourage an early withdrawal, Hizballah (on top of
whatever military losses it has suffered) is harmed
politically, as we can emphasize the fact that the LAF
deployment, not Hizballah's weapons, is what achieved the
Israeli withdrawal.
9. (C/NF) We still need to examine, however, how best to
achieve not just a simple cease-fire but a sustainable
cease-fire. That will require more than 15,000 LAF troops,
no matter how confidently Murr praises their commitment and
abilities. We also suggest that we begin consultations on an
urgent basis with Gulf Arabs in providing needed equipment to
the LAF on an accelerated basis. Whatever the final formula
for the hoped-for sustainable cease-fire, the LAF will surely
play a role, especially in light of this cabinet decision,
and the more quickly we can assemble equipment, the better.
FELTMAN
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
Source: Al Akhbar Newspaper
date: 8/8/2006 5:25
refid: 06BEIRUT2553
origin: Embassy Beirut
classification: CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO3413
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLB #2553/01 2200525
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 080525Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4939
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0035
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0915
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 002553
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2016
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, PTER, LE, IS, SY
SUBJECT: TFLE01: DEFENSE MINISTER MURR CONFIDENT IN RAPID
LAF DEPLOYMENT
Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section 1.4 (d
).
SUMMARY
--------
1. (C) During an August 7 meeting with the Ambassador and
TDY poloff (notetaker), Lebanese Defense Minister Elias Murr
confidently claimed that 15000 LAF troops, if called upon,
could begin deploying to the South within 12 hours. (Note:
this meeting took place before the cabinet decision
authorizing deployment of that number after a full Israeli
withdrawal. End note.) Following this deployment, the LAF
would require assistance from the Arab countries,
particularly Saudi Arabia, in the provision of additional
equipment to support their permanent presence in the South.
Murr stated clearly that the LAF was prepared to hit back at
Hizballah if they attempted to fire at Israel or tried to
draw Israeli fire by placing launchers near to LAF positions.
Turning to the draft UNSC resolution, Murr cautioned that
without a clear solution to the Sheba'a Farms issue, the GOL
would not be able to undercut Hizballah's pretext for
remaining in the South and would therefore have a much harder
time dislodging them. Murr also supported the idea of a
beefed-up UNIFIL with a close coordination mechanism - such
as a Joint Operations Room (long a demand of the
international community) - for quickly passing messages
between the LAF and IDF. End Summary.
ASSESSING THE CURRENT CONFLICT
------------------------------
2. (C) In contrast to his earlier dismissals that Israel
had significantly harmed Hizballah, Murr claimed that
Hizballah had suffered losses of 50 percent of its equipment
as well as 400 fighters during the conflict. While he
estimates that Hizballah has fired off 3000 of its rockets,
he believes that the Syrians were able to resupply Hizballah
with 2500 before the Israelis took out the road links. Murr
believes that the time for a cease-fire is now. The Israelis
will find it much harder to pick off individual rocket
emplacements hidden in towns and villages without causing
significant civilian casualties and more international
uproar. Furthermore, according to Murr, the entire Lebanese
populace, including the Shi'a, are tired of the conflict and
want a cease-fire. This works to the advantage of the
cease-fire actually holding.
3. (C) As to the potential for an escalation of the
conflict, such as a Hizballah attack on Tel Aviv, Murr does
not see that as likely. Murr said that the decision to
strike Tel Aviv with Zilzal 1 and Zilzal 2 missiles would
have to come from Tehran. Israel would have to strike
downtown Beirut, which Murr thinks will not happen. When
asked whether Hizballah might cynically move a rocket
launcher into Solidere in order to draw Israeli aerial fire,
Murr dismissed this as "impossible." Saying that he had 3000
LAF troops stationed in Beirut, Murr scoffed, "Hizballah
cannot launch a rocket from Solidere. I have too many
soldiers there." He also claimed that three days ago the LAF
successfully interdicted a Hizballah-bound container of
rockets and impounded them in the Ministry of Defense,
refusing to release them to Hizballah.
"COUNT ON ME FOR THE DEPLOYMENT"
--------------------------------
4. (C) When asked about the LAF's ability to deploy to the
South, Murr replied that he could have 15,000 troops begin
deployment to seven sectors in the South within 12 hours of a
ceasefire. Pulling out a rough map, Murr elaborated on the
troop deployment numbers in the various sectors (Note. These
geographic sectors are estimates based on a quick glimpse at
the map. End Note.):
2,500 troops southwest of the Litani to the Blue Line ( 60
M48 tanks)
2,500 southeast of the Litani to the Blue Line ( 60 M48 tanks)
2,000 northwest of the Litani up to Sidon ( 60 M48 tanks)
2,000 northeast of the Litani around An-Nabatiyeh ( 60 M48
tanks)
- These two sectors would be augmented by another 1000 troops
BEIRUT 00002553 002 OF 002
already stationed just to the north of them.
2,000 north of the Blue Line roughly above Sheba'a Farms
2,000 north of that sector on the other side of Jabal Bi'r
ad-Dahr
1,000 northeast of those sectors
5. (C) Murr said that he planned to recall 12,000
reservists (something announced in the Lebanese press on
8/7), which he said would take 12 days, and to cancel all
leave for the entire army of 43,000. He added that the LAF,
once deployed, will need to receive additional equipment and
support from Arab nations, particularly Saudi Arabia, and
that he would need U.S. assistance in making that request.
"With a push from you, we can get from the Arab countries the
equipment that we need."
6. (C) Murr did not mention whether or not the LAF would
assume Hizballah's weapons and positions in the South. When
asked if he really thinks Hizballah will peacably accept this
arrangement, Murr challenged, "Let them play with the
Lebanese army. When we're in the South, anyone who moves,
we'll shoot at. No joke." He also thinks that Nabih Berri
will have to accept this plan, thereby providing at least
some Shi'a buy-in. Murr urged though that the international
community support this endeavour by providing a clear answer
on the Sheba'a Farms issue, thereby weakening Hizballah's
pretext for continuing the resistance. "With a political
agreement, no more resistance."
7. (C) Responding to the suggestion that the Israelis will
be skeptical as to the LAF's ability to assume security in
the South, Murr said that he supports the idea of a beefed-up
UNIFIL lending assistance to the LAF mission. He agrees with
establishing a joint operations room with UNIFIL in order to
quickly transmit messages to the IDF in the event of a
Hizballah attack launched from the South, with an eye to also
forestalling an Israeli response which might take out LAF
positions. When asked, Murr said he supports having UNIFIL
or UNTSO monitor points of entry, including ports and
airports, in order to reassure the Israelis that Hizballah
will not be resupplied.
COMMENT
-------
8. (C/NF) This meeting with Murr took place just a few
hours before the cabinet took its historic decision to deploy
15,000 troops to the south upon Israeli withdrawal behind the
Blue Line -- a decision that, had it occurred any time before
Hizballah's July 12 hijacking operation -- would have been
hailed by the international community. From the maps and
files Murr had, planning was already well underway for this
potential deployment before the cabinet decision. The fact
that the cabinet unanimously approved this proposal, with
little debate, indicates that Hizballah is fully on board.
Hizballah's acquiescence in a deployment that it had
strenuously opposed since the Israeli withdrawal from the
south in May 2000 suggests that Hizballah is now ready for a
cease-fire. If we can use this cabinet decision (and other
steps) to encourage an early withdrawal, Hizballah (on top of
whatever military losses it has suffered) is harmed
politically, as we can emphasize the fact that the LAF
deployment, not Hizballah's weapons, is what achieved the
Israeli withdrawal.
9. (C/NF) We still need to examine, however, how best to
achieve not just a simple cease-fire but a sustainable
cease-fire. That will require more than 15,000 LAF troops,
no matter how confidently Murr praises their commitment and
abilities. We also suggest that we begin consultations on an
urgent basis with Gulf Arabs in providing needed equipment to
the LAF on an accelerated basis. Whatever the final formula
for the hoped-for sustainable cease-fire, the LAF will surely
play a role, especially in light of this cabinet decision,
and the more quickly we can assemble equipment, the better.
FELTMAN
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
Source: Al Akhbar Newspaper
