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Sayyed Nasrallah’s Full Speech on October 29th, 2022

Sayyed Nasrallah’s Full Speech on October 29th, 2022
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Translated by Al-Ahed News

Speech of Hezbollah Secretary General His Eminence Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah on the maritime boundaries delimitation between Lebanon and occupied Palestine | 29-10-2022
 
I seek refuge in Allah from the accursed Satan. In the name of Allah the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. Praise be to Allah, Lord of the Worlds, and prayers and peace be upon our Master and Prophet, the Seal of Prophets, Abi al-Qassem Muhammad Bin Abdullah, and his good and pure household and his good and chosen companions and all the prophets and messengers.
 
May the peace, mercy, and blessings of Allah be upon you all.
 
Our talk tonight will focus on one main issue, which is the course of events with the “Israeli” enemy during the past few months, including the negotiations and the agreement or understanding to delineate the maritime borders.
 
Before I start, allow me to tackle a few things briefly.
 
The first point, as is usually the case, is the subject of our fellow scholars and sheikhs. I talk about their departure from this world, and this has become customary.
 
In the past days and weeks, two great and dear scholars from our brothers, who worked hard and made sacrifices, departed to the afterlife.
 
These scholars are His Eminence Sheikh Ismail Al-Khatib, may God have mercy on him, and His Eminence Sheikh Hussein Abdullah, may God have mercy on him.
 
Both lived their lives serving Islam, the resistance, and good people, and they made every effort on this path. We saw only good from them.
 
I extend my deepest condolences and sympathy to the family of Sheikh Ismail Al-Khatib, to our dear people in the town of Tamnin al-Tahta, as well as to all our people in the Bekaa.
 
I extend my deepest condolences and sympathy to the family of Sheikh Hussein Abdullah, our dear people in the town of Atchit, and all our people in the south.
 
My deepest condolences and sympathy for the loss of these two dear and beloved scholars. I ask God Almighty to bestow His mercy and forgiveness on them and grant them the highest ranks. May He give the honorable families patience, solace, and a great reward.
 
The second point is also in the same context; these days mark the 27th anniversary of the martyrdom of the great leader, the Secretary General of the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine, and beloved brother Dr. Fathi Shaqaqi, may God have mercy on him.
 
This leader, along with a group of his honorable brothers, established the Islamic Jihad movement in Palestine and unleashed a new spirit of jihad, a new horizon for resistance, and a new hope for Palestine and the people of Palestine.
 
Dr. Fathi was a jihadist, political, and movement leader. He also possessed thought, high culture, vision, and insight. He contributed along with that generation of Islamic leaders in the early eighties in resolving a set of complications Islamists and Islamic movements faced.
 
Among those was finding a solution to the complex of belonging – the complex of bringing together national affiliation and religious affiliation, especially the Islamic one, on the basis of integration.
 
He gave the Palestinian cause a national dimension as well as an Arab national dimension and an Islamic dimension throughout the Islamic world and a humanitarian dimension throughout the world.
 
The martyr leader Fathi Shaqaqi discovered early on the Islamic revolution in Iran and its leader, Imam Khomeini. He bet on its fateful and decisive role in the Palestinian cause, and he was right.
 
On the day Sayyed Abbas Al-Musawi, our Secretary General, the master of the martyrs of our resistance in Lebanon, was martyred, Dr. Al-Shiqaqi spoke with certainty about the victory of the resistance in Lebanon. This is in 1992.
 
He said that a resistance party whose Secretary General was martyred will not be broken and will be victorious. Of course, this prophecy came true.
 
As if he was also talking about his blessed jihadist movement, which was not broken by his martyrdom. The enemy bet on its fragmentation, dispersion, and loss after the martyrdom of its founding leader.
 
The Islamic Jihad movement held firm and carried on its path with the late great brother Dr. Ramadan Abdullah Shalah, may God have mercy on him, and after him the dear leader brother Abu Tariq.
 
It continued its path, growth, and development to become today one of the advanced vanguard factions that formulate equations and prepare for the great victories in Palestine, God willing.

On his martyrdom anniversary, we renew our condolences to his noble and honorable family, to the leadership of the Islamic Jihad movement, to all our brothers and sisters in this blessed movement, and to the proud, mujahid, and resistant people of Palestine.
 
We also congratulate them on this martyr leader and all those martyrs who passed and continued on the path of liberating Palestine and Al-Quds.
 
One last point before we delve into the main research. There were huge demonstrations in Iranian cities on Friday. On Saturday, there was a massive funeral procession for the oppressed and murdered martyrs in the city of Shiraz.
 
These demonstrations and funeral procession are a strong message from the resistant, patient, and successful Iranian people in everything they endured for more than 40 years.
 
It is a strong message to all the conspirators stating that you are betting on the mirages, illusions, and fantasies that you have always bet on for more than 40 years.
 
This great popular presence, the slogans that were launched, and the firm, clear, and strong stances that were declared are all part of a decisive response to the planners, supporters, and participants in the conspiracy and sedition.
 
There is no doubt that this presence stirs hope in the hearts of supporters all over the world and fills the hearts of haters, lurkers, and enemies with despair. They will be disappointed, God willing.
 
We return to our main file. We will tackle it comfortably. There is no doubt that the nature of the event that took place recently – the agreement that was achieved – was a great and historic achievement and a great victory for Lebanon, the state, the people, and the resistance.
 
Therefore, it is worth pondering and explaining. We must understand this file and explain it from the beginning briefly and in a way that everyone understands within the allotted time. With ease, God willing.
 
Let us conduct a short historical overview between Occupied Palestine and Lebanon. It is known that land borders, which are called today the Lebanese international borders with occupied Palestine, were drawn.
 
These borders were drawn in 1923 or in the twenties. They made some adjustments to them. At that time, France and Britain were the mandate countries. Lebanon was under the French mandate, and Palestine was under the British mandate.
 
They sat down and divided them – as they divided the entire region; they delineated these maritime boundaries with no regard for the will of the Lebanese and the Palestinians.
 
But in practice, these are borders. When the armistice agreement was signed in 1949, these borders were confirmed, which needed some confirmations and embodiments within scientific terminology.
 
As for the maritime boundaries, there was no demarcation between Lebanon and occupied Palestine, not in the twenties, or before the establishment of the usurping entity, i.e., the “Israeli” occupation of Palestine, or after the establishment of the usurping entity. This area was left out.
 
Why didn't a demarcation happen? Lebanon and all the others may not have felt the need to demarcate borders in the first place. As for the occupying entity, it did not feel the need to demarcate the borders because it considered its borders from the Nile to the Euphrates. It does not abide by international laws and the Law of the Sea, nor does it enter these treaties; its borders are where its power, oppression, and tyranny reach.
 
But with regard to Lebanon, the issue was not on the table, perhaps because there was no need, until the talk began a few years ago.
 
After 2000, 2005, and 2007, it was said that there are large quantities of oil and gas present in the Mediterranean Sea, across from the Lebanese shores, in the Lebanese territorial waters, and in the supposed exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
 
It was said that there are oil and gas fields, especially off the shores of southern Lebanon. This high possibility was later confirmed by studies, institutions, and countries. Thus, there became an urgent need for Lebanon to draw its borders, be it its maritime borders for its territorial waters or the maritime borders of the exclusive economic zone.
 
From here, follow-up at the Lebanese official level and the Lebanese popular support began, but in a limited way because the file was not as urgent as it has become in the past few months.
 
Before I continue, I have to clarify an idea. These are terms that exist, but I will shed light on them in a simple way. Even politicians, media figures, and preachers usually misuse these terms.
 
There is something called territorial waters [or territorial sea]. The territorial sea is a belt of coastal waters extending at most 12 nautical miles (equivalent to 22 km) from the baseline [usually the mean low-water mark] of a coastal state.
 
There is a second type of water that also has its own calculation mechanism and measurement called contiguous waters [zone]. After that, there are waters that are usually part of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
 
Of course, there is not a lot of talk about the contiguous zone. It may be the first time that people have heard of this term in general. It is not mentioned in the media because usually the contiguous zone is included in the exclusive economic zone.
 
So, let us move past the contiguous zone and say that the territorial waters extend 22 km from the Lebanese coast. Then, the exclusive economic zone begins. The EEZ has its own laws, calculation mechanisms, and various forms.
 
If we take Lebanon as an example, we have to consider its maritime boundaries with occupied Palestine and Syria. Since Cyprus is adjacent to us, we have to take it into consideration.
 
Hence, the demarcation of the maritime boundaries will take place in the south and the north. There is a certain calculation mechanism with Cyprus. This is what we call [the delimitation of] the economic zone.
 
The difference between the territorial waters and the economic zone is that the former is part of the state just like a piece of land. Therefore, the Lebanese state has complete sovereignty over these waters. This sovereignty also extends to the airspace over and seabed below. Lebanon benefits from the [natural] wealth and resources.
 
As for the exclusive economic zone, it does not have sovereignty and is not considered part of the country like the territorial waters. However, the state to which the EEZ belongs has certain rights such as investing resources in it. In any case, all this is in the law.
 
I just wanted to draw your attention to this topic because, for example, someone could say, we want to extract from Block 8, from our territorial waters. This is wrong because Block 8 is not in our territorial waters. Block 8 is in Lebanon’s exclusive economic zone.
 
After this clarification, we say, based on the need, which I will explain later, Lebanon has become concerned about delineating its borders, especially the southern borders because they are the subject of discussion now. I will not talk about what happened with Cyprus. We will talk about the achievements and victories.
 
We wanted to delimitate our southern borders with occupied Palestine. Part of it will define our territorial waters and our exclusive economic zone. In light of the delimitation of the Lebanese maritime boundaries with occupied Palestine, Lebanon will come to demarcate the blocks. This is what practically happened.
 
Allow me to state this brief history so that the whole scene is complete for the listeners. In August 2011, the Lebanese Parliament passed Law No. 163, which authorized the Lebanese government to issue decrees in the Council of Ministers to define the points that form the Lebanese maritime boundaries. This law gave a mandate to the government.
 
The Lebanese government met and made a decision. It issued Decree No. 6433 on 10-10-2011– these numbers are in circulation – under the title of ‘Delineation of the boundaries of the exclusive economic zone of Lebanon’.
 
It adopted Line 23 and reserved Lebanon’s right to amend the maritime boundaries if more precise data becomes available and in the light of the ongoing negotiations.
 
Lebanon delineated this line and issued a decree specifying the coordinates. It's all there. It sent a copy of the decree to the United Nations.
 
Based on the authorization of the Parliament with the aforementioned decision and law and based on the decree issued by the Council of Ministers, we can consider that there was an official Lebanese defining our maritime boundaries, which are practically known as Line 23.
 
Line 23 starts from a specific point on the Lebanese coast in Naqoura, which is a point of contention and conflict between us and the occupation, and runs along the line that connects it, which they practically call Line 23, in the light of which the Lebanese territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone are determined.
 
Here, it became imperative for all the Lebanese to work to liberate all the maritime areas north of this line, namely the southern are in the sea, be it the territorial waters or the exclusive economic zone. Lebanon either has sovereignty over it or rights to it, and therefore, we must work to liberate it, free it, and save it from “Israeli” domination.
 
Here, we are facing a new issue – liberating these water and maritime areas since they belong to the EEZ. Instead of saying an exclusive economic zone, I will say territorial waters. Economic means an exclusive economic zone.
 
It’s a national issue that concerns all people without exception. It concerns the Lebanese state, the people, and the resistance.
 
I would like to remind you, here, of the position of the resistance in 2000, on the eve of the liberation on 25 May 2000. We announced a position and you heard it in all the speeches during the last stage. But I will repeat and mention it briefly.
 
We, the resistance, as a main faction do not interfere in the delimitation of the boundaries. This is the responsibility of the state. Why does the resistance not interfere in the delimitation of the boundaries? We said for ideological, political, and realistic reasons, and we talked about it a lot, so we will not repeat it.
 
Therefore, since 2000, we have said that when the Lebanese state says that these are the land borders, the responsibility of the resistance, its right, and duty is to liberate this land recognized by the Lebanese state as Lebanese.
 
The same applies to maritime boundaries. The resistance will consider what the Lebanese state considers to be Lebanese territorial waters and Lebanese EEZ.
 
Therefore, this is the responsibility of the state, and the resistance does not interfere with it. The resistance does not make up lines and other maritime and land boundaries regardless of what the Lebanese state says.
 
The resistance has not done this before, during, or after 2000. It will not do so today, and we clearly declared this.
 
The state considers Line 23 to be the maritime boundary and left room for amendments later. In the context of the speech, I will respond to the remarks.
 
Some remarks are being raised about Line 29, which has supporters. Discussions over Line 29 and Line 23, more or less, are not with the resistance. We have nothing to do with this discussion. You can take this up with state officials.
 
In any case, it would have been better for those demanding this line – i.e., Line 29 – to start their political, media, and human rights struggle on 10/1/2011, that is when the Lebanese government issued this decree.
 
The debate should’ve started back then in the House of Representatives, the Parliament, and public opinion. They should’ve put pressure on the Lebanese state to adjust this line and convince it that our border is until Line 29, not Line 23.
 
In any case, this discussion become heated in the past year, i.e., in recent months. It is not a problem. We believe it’s the natural and legal right of those who believe in this concept to express their opinion.
 
It is also their political right to fight for it. If they can make the Lebanese state amend the borders, we as a resistance do not have a problem.
 
We have nothing to do with this discussion. If the Lebanese state says that our maritime boundary is Line 29, then the resistance is obligated to struggle, resist, and fight in order to liberate all the maritime spaces north of Line 29.
 
But I say to these gentlemen and parties, carry on with your struggle without treachery, accusations, insults, and the use of such language.
 
Make an effort if you are able to change the decision of the Lebanese state. This will later be reflected, even on this signed demarcation agreement. But we, dear ones, have nothing to do with this discussion.
 
Based on the fact that Line 23 was determined by the government’s official bodies in Lebanon that are related to the petroleum sector and the effort that was made between the Ministry of Energy and other parties, the division of the blocks was also carried out.
 
Thus, Lebanon came to possess a maritime border as well as  blocks adjacent to the maritime border line with occupied Palestine famously known as blocks 8, 9, and 10. These blocks became more famous than the rest of the blocks.
 
Let us display the first map. This line is assumed to be Line 23, i.e., these maritime borders. This is the Lebanese coast; here is occupied Palestine. This color is the territorial waters. This is where the boys put the contiguous waters that practically become part of the EEZ. This is basically an exclusive economic zone, so the exclusive economic zone becomes these two colors.
 
They also divided the blocks. A block must be 5000 meters or more far from the coast, according to the law. Hence, they moved it away from the coasts, and the line of blocks runs in this way.
 
Now, we have these ten blocks, and Lebanon must work to extract oil and gas from those ten blocks and not only from blocks 4 and 9.
 
However, it so happened that the companies came and committed to blocks 4 and 9; otherwise, all blocks are supposed to be included.
 
What is the practical need for demarcation and engaging in indirect negotiations with the enemy? Simply put, the need arose when Lebanon brought in companies to survey the southern border blocks.
 
The “Israeli” enemy prevented the companies, which are well-known international and foreign companies, from conducting a survey.
 
In addition, if the time came for the companies to explore blocks 8, 9, or 10, the “Israelis” would have also prevented them from doing so. This was settled.
 
The “Israelis” clearly declared that they consider this area theirs, that it is part of their exclusive economic zone. That is why they delineated a border, a line, known as Line 1.
Indeed, they delineated Line 1 starting from Naqoura with disparity. This line is the point of land dispute between Lebanon and the occupation.
 
The “Israelis” delineated Line 1, which is practically one line – we will also show it to you – that takes up a huge area of what Lebanon assumed or decided was our right as territorial waters and exclusive economic zone.
 
Therefore, they claim that this area, this huge area and these blocks are theirs, and it is forbidden for anyone to explore, excavate, dig, or extract.
 
The discussion here is not about half of Qana or a third of Qana. The discussion is about the whole area. I will show this later on the map. Hence, the enemy will prevent action in this area and has taken control of it. The enemy’s battleships are not all there.
 
Yet, when someone approaches the area bordering the blocks to conduct a survey or engage in any activity related to oil and gas, the “Israeli” enemy will intervene and expel and shoot at them.
 
It exercises power, dominance, and control over this area. The “Israelis” even claim that this area belongs to them and that it is within their maritime boundaries and part of their territorial waters and EEZ.
 
That is why they delineated the blocks based on Line 1. This means that the south of Line 1 goes towards the rest of occupied Palestine. They delineated their blocks that extend opposite the Palestinian coast.
 
Now, we will also see on the map Line 1 and Line 3. Of course, it is usually the surveyors who provide us with the numbers. There is a number between Line 1 and Line 23 – what the enemy and the Lebanese state each claim – that is being circulated.
 
Some people say it is 860 km2. Others conducted studies on the subject and it appears that it is 879 km2.
 
On the map that I have, the guys adopted 879. In any case, these numbers need to be double-checked. We are not adopting any now.
 
In addition, these companies, even those that pledged and made commitments to start digging, exploring, and excavating in Block 9 at the southern maritime boundaries, were prevented and threatened by countries like America and other Western countries.
 
These companies were forbidden to work. They were not only afraid of “Israeli” field domination but also of the American ban – we will impose sanctions on you. They were banned from working.
 
This was in addition to the American blockade on Lebanon and pressure on the Lebanese state to give up borders and accept Line 1 that the “Israelis” are asking for or the line proposed by the first American mediator. Whatever the goal, there was also a ban.
 
Hence, the reality on the ground is that there are Line 1 and Line 23, and it is forbidden to work within this area. Therefore, this area needs to be defined, demarcated, and liberated so that we can enable Lebanon to explore, drill, excavate, and extract oil and gas from these blocks. Mind you, everyone nowadays is saying something, but what is being circulated is that there is enormous wealth in these blocks.
 
We are displaying the second map. This is the Naqoura area. Of course, because the scene of the dispute between us and the occupation is small, the red line is Line 23. The “Israelis” delineated a line close to this and escalated.
 
This is Line1. Line 1 practically takes a part of our territorial waters and parts of Block 10 and Block 9. It also takes a larger part of Block 8, almost half of Block 8. This has become the scene.
 
Today, this area – that is, up until before the agreement – is considered a Lebanese area, whether we call it a regional or an exclusive economic zone. The area is occupied and controlled by the “Israeli” enemy. The responsibility of the state, the people, and the resistance is to liberate these marine spaces and the resources in them.
 
The state’s choice to serve this goal was to engage in indirect negotiations with the enemy. At that time, there was an implicit agreement between the leaders [the president, prime minister, and parliament speaker] and at the state level.
 
Here, we are talking about 2009, 2010, and 2011. It was agreed that His Excellency Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri assumes the responsibility of following up and directing this file at the level of negotiation and communication.
 
Speaker Nabih Berri did not act in his capacity as the head of the Amal Movement or the head of a major parliamentary bloc to which a large number of deputies in the south belong, not even as the head of the Parliament.
 
Rather, His Excellency Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri adopted this at the state level, at the level of heads and state institutions. He assumed the responsibility of following up on this file within agreed-upon and settled bases at the level of the Lebanese state.
 
Since the negotiations began – if we say in 2010-2011 when the American mediator [Frederic] Hof started – until before the last stage – we call the last stage the Karish stage – the resistance was not asked for anything specific.
 
The talk was that we are going to negotiations, let us see what will happen through indirect negotiations.
 
Yes, the resistance was kept in the loop about the contacts and negotiations. In the end, we live in the country and are concerned in one way or another.
 
In the beginning, the choice was to resort to the United Nations, meaning that the United Nations be the indirect mediator between Lebanon and the enemy.
 
At that time, a meeting took place between Speaker Nabih Berri and the then UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. He asked that the United Nations come and assume this responsibility – mediate and lead indirect negotiations.
 
Mr. Ban Ki-moon made it clear that the United Nations could not do that and advised that the only party capable of leading mediation of this kind was the United States of America. Accordingly, the Lebanese official decision was to talk with the Americans so that they would be the mediators.
 
Indeed, the Americans appointed a mediator, Mr. Hof, who became known since the line was named after him. Many mediators came after Hof – we will not mention all their names – the last of whom was Mr. [Amos] Hochstein. From 2010 to 2011, there were several American mediators.
 
The first mediator, Hof, suggested a line following a series of negotiations. He considered it a line of settlement. The Americans dealt with the fact that this issue – as they frankly said in interviews – has nothing to do with laws, rules, or principles, but rather with settlements.
 
Of course, when it comes to settlements, it is a matter of strength and weakness. When the law is set aside, there is no more place for values, morals, and humanity. It’s about making settlements and imposing options on people and countries.
 
In any case, a line was delineated. This line is delineated between Line 1, which the enemy claims, and the Lebanese state’s Line 23. The line was placed in the middle.
 
According to this line, it gave 45% of this area to the enemy and 55% of this area to Lebanon, i.e., 490 kilometers for Lebanon and 389 kilometers for the enemy.
 
Of course, this was very unfair to Lebanon. Practically, when someone says these are my boundaries, there is no longer a possibility to reduce them. Rather, there is the possibility to increase.
 
This means that when the Lebanese government confirmed Line 23, it can later be extended but not decreased.
 
Early on, when Speaker Berri was tasked with overseeing the file, he declared clearly that we will not give up even a glass of water. Indeed, this is what happened.
 
In any case, Lebanon officially rejected the Hof Line. Let's take a look at its map. We repeat and mention that this is Naqoura; this is block 10, block 9, block 8; this is Line 1 in blue; and this red line is the Lebanese border. Hof delineated this line which is in green. He practically divided the area in this way.
 
By doing so, Lebanon would have 490 Km2 and the enemy 389 Km2. As you can see on the maps, we did not show the Qana field because discussions were still over the lines, and things were not clear with regard to the Qana field.
 
In any case, the whole discussion revolved around this line. The Lebanese were told that this is the line and you will not reach a result. So, accept from now and take advantage of the time.
 
Speaker Berri and state officials came under American pressure. It’s true that Speaker Berri was responsible and the one negotiating and holding meetings, but the Americans were talking to everyone and putting pressure on everyone because they knew the Lebanese composition – who can influence whom and how.
 
In the end, the official Lebanese position rejected the Hof Line.
 
Behind the scenes, there were Lebanese who accepted [the Hof Line], those who rejected it, and those who were going to accept it. This matter requires more scrutiny, but now we are talking about appearances.
 
As it appears, the Lebanese state was absolutely against accepting the Hof Line. At the very least, I know some figures [who rejected the Hof Line], but I care more about the fact that the one who was handling the file, who was Speaker Nabih Berri, was decisive in this matter.
 
On the other hand, the enemy did not show any signs of acceptance of the Hof Line, either. They insisted on Line 1. During all the debates that took place in the “Israeli” entity in the past weeks and months, the opposition to the Lapid government was clear that they were counting on Line 1, not the Hof line.
 
The Americans were telling the Lebanese to accept [the Hof Line] so that we can convince the “Israelis”. What does this usually mean in tactics?
 
It means that they persuaded the Lebanese to accept the Hof Line. Then, the “Israelis” would say that they want additional concessions from Lebanon.
 
Lebanon will have conceded and got lower than the Hof Line. All the mediators that came after Hoff until Mr. Hochstein's time put pressure [on Lebanon]. As you know, when the Americans put pressure, the “Israelis” prevent [action from being taken] on the field.
 
Lebanon was running out of time, and the Lebanese too were pressed for time, until we reached September 22, 2022. It became clear that things had reached a certain place.
 
Speaker Berri, during all these negotiations, did not make any concessions regarding Lebanon's rights and demands, as well as the demands of the Lebanese state.
 
He bore the burden of all this stage until he announced the end of his direct responsibility – not his responsibility to oversee the file. He announced the framework agreement. This is where you have all been keeping pace.
 
I even had to sit with some friends and hear from them what happened. They told me, and I read some documents to remember what has happened since 2000.
 
In any case, the Lebanese have been keeping pace regarding what happened during these few months, from 2020 until the present. The Lebanese know about the framework agreement.
 
The framework agreement was announced, and the direct responsibility for managing the negotiations was transferred to His Excellency President Michel Aoun, and the Lebanese army was assigned to negotiate.
 
According to the framework agreement, a Lebanese delegation and other delegations from other parties were assumed to be formed, and there would be meetings under the auspices of the United Nations and the support of the American mediator, and they would meet in Naqoura and negotiate.
 
Here, the responsibility of following up was transferred from the Parliament Speaker to His Excellency the President after September 22, 2020.
 
It is true there is no chemistry between them, but for us, Hezbollah and the resistance, we consider that the file has moved from one loyal hand to another and from one resilient man to another.
 
He [Speaker Berri] was not only resilient in indirect negotiations related to the maritime boundaries, but also in the negotiations that took place during the July war. Meanwhile, the President [Aoun] is known for clinging to his rights and not conceding. No one can pressure him – not a state, an embassy, or anything.
 
Therefore, we remained in a safe zone. I do not intend to offend anyone. If this file was transferred to someone else, we might have decided to give them this description.
 
Tonight, I am keen to be as fair as possible. Negotiations began in Naqoura under the guidance of His Excellency the President. A number of meetings took place.
 
At that time, the idea of Line 29 was proposed to be a negotiating line to reach Line 23. I will not delve into this discussion now.
 
The negotiations in Naqoura practically reached a dead end at the end of 2021. With the change of the American administration – during Trump's term, the American mediator at that time was putting extraordinary pressure.
 
I personally know some Lebanese officials who told me that [Jared] Kushner, Trump's son-in-law, was personally calling them and asking them to accept this file and that it should be closed.
 
There was great pressure from the Trump administration for Lebanon to accept the Hof Line and finish this issue under that administration.
 
When the American administration changed, Mr. Hochstein was assigned at the end of 2021, and he came to Lebanon and held meetings.
 
He also presented a new advanced proposal on the Hof Line. However, the Hof proposal did not fulfill the Lebanese demands or rights. Hence, the issue remained within the framework of discussions.
 
In this milieu, major events began unfolding in the world. Here, we entered the final stage. The Russian-Ukrainian war began, and great international development took place. New strategies were put in place related to the issue of energy, oil, and gas, not buying Russian oil and gas, etc. I will return to this shortly.
 
Here, the “Israelis”, who had finished exploring, digging, and excavating in Karish, had summoned the Greek ship to start the extraction.
 
The Lebanese state and resistance learned that this ship had arrived in the Karish field to begin the extraction of oil and gas there. Here, a whole new phase in history begins; we must record that the ship arrived between the 3rd and 5th of June 2022. The final stage of this process begins on this date.
 
When this matter became known, the three leaders – President Aoun, Speaker Berri, and Prime Minister Mikati, issued statements, called each other, and spoke on the phone.
 
We as a resistance relied on the statements issued by the leaders. The statement concluded that the start of the extraction is an aggression and a transgression against Lebanon, that this is a disputed area, and that this hope should not happen before the completion of the demarcation of the maritime boundaries.
 
Based on the official position issued by the three leaders, the resistance took an advanced position, which was also surprising for the “Israelis”. We will talk about it later in the analysis.
 
The resistance announced that it would not allow the “Israeli” enemy to extract oil and gas from the Karish field before reaching an agreement through indirect negotiations that meets the official Lebanese demands.
 
In all the speeches that I, my brothers, and Hezbollah officials delivered as well as the statements that were issued and the interviews that were conducted, not once did we say that these are our demands, Hezbollah’s demands, or the resistance’s demands.
 
No, we used to say these are the demands of the Lebanese state. Based on this threat, we were facing a whole new phase. There was a whole new atmosphere.
 
Of course, it was a great position. The resistance used to say that it [extraction] was forbidden, and if you started extracting or we find out that you started extracting, we will prevent that by force, even if it leads to striking these targets, repercussions, a war, or any other consequence.
 
Later, when it was discussed how far the resistance would go, we escalated our position and said that it does not only concern Karish, but rather what’s beyond Karish, and what’s far beyond Karish, including all platforms, fields, and existing facilities – all of which are certainly in the reach of the missiles and drones of the resistance in Lebanon.
 
This unified and strong official Lebanese position and the serious threat by the resistance practically led to putting “Israel” under severe pressure.
 
The Lapid government was left with two options; it can either insist on extracting oil and gas from Karish and disregard the official Lebanese position and the resistance’s threat. This meant a confrontation that might develop into a war between the resistance and “Israel” and possibly between Lebanon and “Israel”. It might even develop into a regional war. This is a problem.
 
Or it can stop and cancel the Karish issue completely and say it is over, Karish is behind us, and we do not want to negotiate with Lebanon. Lebanon has waited 10 years and can wait another 20 years.
 
This would be very difficult for them, politically, morally, economically, and at the security level. This would be a long-term humiliation for them. 
 
It is as if you have been conducting surveillance and excavations since 2012-2013, you have promised your people in the entity – apart from the international need and a historic opportunity – then as a result of Lebanon’s threat, you canceled the Karish project.
 
Therefore, the only other option available to the enemy was to engage in indirect negotiations. Also, the Americans came under pressure because their priority was the Russian-Ukrainian war and a major battle with Russia. Therefore, they certainly cannot bear a second war in the region.
 
Hochstein talked about this after the whole issue was over. I will read to you part of what he said. He says in an interview with The New York Times that fear of war was behind reaching the understanding.
 
He points out that the war was a realistic threat and that if it took place, all the oil and gas fields would have been disrupted, along with international trade in the Mediterranean, including the disruption of the flow of energy resources between the Gulf and Europe.
 
Some Lebanese who are displeased with the deal have not read this – the person responsible for mediating the deal is saying that the reason behind these understandings taking place is fear of war.
 
The “Israelis”, the opposition, and the government said the same logic. I will return to this in a bit. This development hastened the return of the US mediator to Lebanon and the region. Hence, active and accelerated negotiations began.
 
Of course, His Excellency the President, in cooperation with the Speaker and Prime Minister, formed a team, and this team became the one negotiating.
 
I do not want to go into names; we thank them for their efforts. The team made a great effort and was subjected to great pressure. The negotiations were not easy. No one can imagine that the negotiations from start to finish – i.e., until Hochstein’s last signature – were easy.
 
No, there was great pressure and ideas. For example, some wanted to take part of Block 8, while others wanted to make an exchange at Lebanon's expense. Of course, the exchange was unacceptable. Regarding the Qana field, there was a big problem related to Lebanon's right to the entire field and its management.
 
The Americans were taking the Lebanese on a course that would implicate them in the issue of normalization with the “Israeli” enemy.
 
In the end, there was a problem with the line. There was a big problem related to when we start from Naqoura to the line. This is what the Lebanese later preserved through terminology; it was called the line of buoys. I will explain it on the map now.
 
The “Israelis” wanted to take the point that they had set, which is within Lebanese territory. In other words, they wanted to take Lebanese lands and sensitive Lebanese lands. This has an effect on the entire landline.
 
From there, they wanted to draw a line close to the current line of buoys. Then, they’d consider that this was the boundary and we’re done.
 
There were a set of points, and the negotiations almost reached a dead end at some stages and on some nights. It’s over. We were in an atmosphere that suggested that were heading toward war.
 
People were not informed so they do not get scared and worried. However, on some nights, in fact, we reached a point that it’s over – ‘come on guys, it seems that we are going to a war in a few days.’
 
This was the atmosphere of the negotiations. Of course, there is no doubt that the firmness and steadfastness of the Lebanese negotiator and the leaders, be it President Aoun, who was directing, Speaker Nabih Berri, and President Mikati who stood by them, was one of the reasons.
 
Therefore, the issue was very essential in the negotiation process because there were pressure, intimidation, and threats.
 
In addition to that, if you remember, the “Israelis” began threatening to destroy Lebanon, crush Lebanon, and occupy Lebanon. There was no one left in the enemy entity who did not issue threats against Lebanon.
 
The “Israeli” threat to destroy and the American pressure to accept unsuitable settlements for Lebanon coincided with the difficulty of the negotiations.
 
Eventually, they found that the Lebanese position was unwavering and the resistance was serious. It was here that we sent the drones.
 
In the beginning, they thought it was just part of the psychological warfare and all talk. But when the drones were sent, they realized that it was not psychological warfare and mere talk and speeches. I mentioned this previously.
 
The field data pointed out that the resistance has in fact begun to prepare for an all-out war. The “Israelis” were following this, and all the intelligence services in Lebanon were working on it and seeing it.
 
As a result, this last agreement was reached. What happened in the negotiations? I prefer that the negotiation team talk about the negotiations and give details and explanations when they find a suitable time.
 
For me, my brothers, and our team, what matters to us is the essence. As I spoke previously regarding the agreement, there are literature as well as technical and legal issues that someone may have remarks on. For us, the main issue is the essence, which is linked to the results.
 
The results:
 
We come to the results. Objectively speaking, despite the last turmoil, which started with the arrival of the Greek ship to Karish and ended with the delivery of the documents in Naqoura, we believe that Lebanon got everything it wanted, with the exception of one thing that remained pending, which I will explain later.
 
But the result was very excellent and great. I am talking – seriously – about a historic achievement and a great victory. How could this be translated?
 
1-   Lebanon rejected the “Israeli” Line 1 and the Hof Line. It endured the American pressure – the pressure to accept this line – the “Israeli” threat, the blockade, the dangers, and the pressure of time – because Lebanon needed to excavate and extract and insisted on Line 23, which it believed to be its maritime boundaries, and it got it in full except for a place I will talk about shortly.
 
2-  It insisted on complete blocks, without any exchange, swap, or modification. It obtained all of Block 10, Block 9, and Block 8 that were delineated by the Lebanese state.
 
3-  It got more than that. As we will see on the map, part of the Qana field lies south of Line 23. Since Lebanon’s border is Line 23, two-thirds of the Qana field s lies within our borders and a third of it is outside the borders.
 
From a position of strength, Lebanon said that the entire Qana field, including the one underwater and underground south of Line 23, is also ours, and we want it.
 
It got it, its full right to the Qana field, on the entire Qana field. Therefore, it can be found in the agreement that Lebanon has no commitment to the enemy and will give no compensation, money, or anything.
 
On the other hand, the enemy is obligated to not engage in any activity towards part of the Qana field that is located south of line 23. There is an issue between the operating companies and the enemy; this is their business. Let them give them what they want. This is the third achievement.
 
4-  As for the fourth achievement, which is also of a very high degree of importance, it is lifting the ban on companies. Soon these companies, which have committed, will start working, especially in Block 9 since there is an old commitment.
 
Now, this company can start working in this block, and the “Israeli” enemy will not threaten it, shoot at it, or prevent it at all. What is the guarantee? We will come back to it shortly.
 
According to the agreement, this ban has been lifted. The American and Western ban in the context of the blockade on Lebanon has also been lifted. On the contrary, they have announced their commitment to encourage these companies to come and start drilling, exploration, extraction in Lebanon, etc. Whether they will fulfill their promises or not is a different story. These are commitments made and given to Lebanon.
 
5-  After the delimitation, Lebanon’s share of the exclusive economic zone with Cyprus will also expand. What happened with Cyprus was based on the “Israeli” Line 1, unfortunately.
 
This means that Lebanon delimitated the EEZ with Cyprus based on Line 1. The Cypriots were not ready for discussions back then. However, now they are, and God willing, it will be sorted out based on Line 23. This will expand the exclusive economic zone.
 
6-  The last point that I want to refer to is the beginning of breaking the American and Western blockade on Lebanon.
 
Some say that there is no blockade. After all, you know that the Americans are the ones who are not allowing Egyptian gas and Jordanian electricity from reaching Lebanon, even though they promised to allow – the all too well-known false promise.
 
Tomorrow, you will see what their position will be on the aid that the Islamic Republic of Iran has accepted to provide to Lebanon regarding fuel, which will cause a very big shift in the issue of electricity. Tomorrow is just a day away.
 
They’ve started talking that we should bring this gas directly to the power plants, that it will generate electricity 24 hours a day, and that it will put Lebanon on the path of economic development.
 
Hochstein, Blinken, and Biden all spoke. God willing, this is a major shift, even if it was in their public position. When it comes to practice, let us see what will happen.
 
It is very important to remind you that Lebanon did not provide any security guarantees throughout all of this. If there were any security guarantees, security arrangements, or security agreements under the table, Lapid and Gantz would have told their people about them since they have elections now and this will be considered a great achievement for the Lapid government.
 
But there is none of this. On the contrary, they said that there were no security guarantees or arrangements and that its security guarantee is its strength. They also provided a second security guarantee. What is it?
 
Look where we’ve become. What is the second security guarantee? When the Lebanese, after the agreement, start digging and exploring and own an oil and gas extraction station in the maritime border area – i.e., the enemy has a station and the Lebanese have a station – the resistance will not strike Karish for fear that “Israel” will strike the Qana station. What did the enemy admit here?
 
The enemy is not talking about an agreed-upon guarantee, rather it is recognizing the balance of deterrence; if we want the resistance not to bomb Karish, we must allow the Lebanese to build a station and extract oil and gas and profit from it. This way, the resistance is deterred and will not bomb Karish.
 
The “Israelis” can also threaten the resistance; if you bomb Karish, we will bomb the Qana station, for example. I do not know what the Lebanese will name the station.
 
They have no guarantees. This is, of course, one of the scenes of Lebanon's strength.
 
Secondly, without getting involved in any form of normalization with the enemy, neither in the form nor in indirect negotiations, and as I spoke previously, even with documents, Lebanon and the enemy did not sign on one paper.
 
The “Israelis” signed on one paper, and Lebanon signed on a different one – the President signed on another paper. The documents were given to the United States and the United Nations.
 
The whole complex discussion over the Qana field was related to not engaging in any normalization with the “Israeli” enemy.
 
Among the people who are most problematic with the issue of normalization, who are with normalization, and who support normalization are those who accuse us of becoming like them.
 
They implicitly admit that normalization is an ugly and heinous matter, and they accuse us of it. They are the ones who support normalization and have normalized.
 
When it comes to our issue, there is no suspicion of normalization. But “Israeli” Prime Minister Lapid will try to exaggerate the achievement suggesting that we [Hezbollah] recognized them.
 
There are even people in Lebanon as well as some Arab countries who spoke about recognition. Most of them support the recognition of “Israel”.
 
I want to ask them a question – because we have already taken up a lot of time and the issue is so clear that it does not need much discussion.
 
After the liberation of the south in 2000, His Excellency President Emile Lahoud assigned a delegation of Lebanese army officers. On the other side, there was the “Israelis” and UNIFIL, i.e., the United Nations. At that time, there was a dispute over the land borders.
 
If you remember, the issue took months to be resolved. Millions of meters were recovered and liberated. A group of points remained pending and still are. We are talking about land borders, which may be more important or no less important.
 
No one came out to say that Lebanon, which is negotiating indirectly through UNIFIL on its borders, points, and the application of demarcation, was recognizing the enemy.
 
This is not a recognition of the enemy. Does this exist or not? Let us not waste time.
 
In any case, His Excellency the President said in recent interviews that this is a technical issue and has nothing to do with politics at all. That’s it.
 
What is left is that part. If we take the two points of disagreement between us and them and we delineated our line – because we are going forward and they entered into Lebanese territory – and they delineated their line, we will have a triangle like this. Let me show it to you. The area [of the triangle] is 2.5 square kilometers.
 
This narrow space, this little triangle is what is left pending. Of course, the enemy aspired to take it in the negotiations. They pushed a lot regarding the issue, but Lebanon refused. The entire agreement stopped on this point, so the way out was to postpone talking about it.
 
As long as Lebanon took the blocks and Line 23 in this area, let each party maintain its right and position on it. We say these are Lebanese territorial waters because they are all located in the Lebanese territorial waters and not in the exclusive economic zone since it is all approximately 5000 meters in length and its area is approximately 2.5 square kilometers.
 
We consider it part of the Lebanese territorial waters and is occupied by the enemy. Let the enemy consider it what it wants. With regard to Lebanon, there is no text allowing the “Israelis” to do whatever they want with it or claim it is their right.
 
Therefore, this is an occupied area, and it is the duty of Lebanon, the state, the people, and the resistance to work at any time to regain it and liberate it.
 
Yes, Lebanon did not achieve this. On the other hand, everything Lebanon was looking to gain from this file, it achieved it. Therefore, when someone says that Lebanon got 95 %, they are not exaggerating. There is 5% remaining. Some exaggerate and say 100%.
 
We, however, cannot say 100% because this area is a disputed area. Lebanon insists on it being an occupied area, while the “Israelis” insist on remaining in it. This is the line of buoys.
 
We come to the maps. This is the Qana field. There is no longer a Hof Line. We are done with Line 1. Apart from the area that I will show you in a bit, Lebanon has attained the rest of the maritime boundaries that it considers as its regional maritime boundaries, as well as the EEZ and the entire Qana field.
 
The area that remained is a point of contention, and this is the last map. We and the enemy disagree. This is Lebanon, and this is Palestine. Our point comes from the front, and theirs come from the back. Lebanon delineated this line like so. This is Line 1, and this is the line of buoys. This is point 20, and the issue is resolved and done.
 
Talking about delimitation, all this is for Lebanon. It considers the rest of this area, which practically covers an area of 2.5 square kilometers, occupied.
 
The “Israelis” put this line of buoys and prevent anyone from going to it. Why is there a dispute here? The dispute is not only related to the water. It is mainly reflected on the land because if Lebanon accepts the “Israeli” point of departure, this will affect the Lebanese land area and will also affect other points that will still be subject to dispute.
 
In practice, if we calculated 879 km2 and removed 2.5, it will approximately be 876 km2 that were liberated. If it was 860 km2 and we took out 3, it will be 857 km2 that were liberated. What do you call this?
 
It is clear when someone says this is a historic achievement and a great victory.
 
In addition to other obligations and other aspects that we talked about, including the freedom to work, starting from tomorrow, companies can go to that area after all parties have been notified and begin serious and required work.
 
That is why we said it is a great and very big victory for Lebanon, the state, the people, and the resistance. it is a great historical achievement.
 
In the last section, we will talk a little about analyzing the situation and the reasons, and we will be objective and realistic.
 
There is no doubt that there are international, regional, and local factors that helped achieve victory. There is no discussion about this.
 
We do not deny this issue, but the most important thing is that the Lebanese state and the resistance seizing this historical moment. It’s possible that this historical moment and circumstances passed and nothing happened. You don’t gain anything.
 
However, the circumstances are not the cause and the reason, rather they are a  helping factor. The real position, after the care and support of God Almighty, is that Lebanon and the resistance, along with the people, seized this historical moment and acted accordingly.
 
A. When we talk about the circumstances, let me give you an example – the Russian-Ukrainian war and its various political and security repercussions as well as the issue of energy, food, the economy, etc.
 
B. America's priority in that war and its quest to avoid another war in our region pressured the Americans and made them negotiate and put pressure on the “Israelis”.
 
C. The West’s need for oil and gas: It wants [oil and gas] from the Mediterranean, not just from Karish. It wants from Karish, Lebanon, and the entire region.
 
This issue is not a matter of a year, two, three, or four. The Americans and the West are following a strategy of fully weaning of Russian oil and gas. Therefore, they want an alternative.
 
It is not about a few years until we are able to extract. There is an approved strategy, and the Europeans will have priority to rely on oil and gas from the Mediterranean. This is also a factor.
 
D. But the most important thing that we must build our analysis and understanding on is the enemy's unpreparedness to engage in war. This also means that our enemy, who are the “Israelis”, are not ready to go to war.
 
First, as a result of their sharp internal divisions, which they talk about every day and describe as their greatest threat. Those in the “Israeli” government and in the opposition say that their disputes, divisions, and internal conflicts are the primary threat to this ugly entity.
 
Second, the situation of the army and the home front.
 
Third, their economic ambitions: At the end of the day, they have the opportunity to sell gas and oil. Why go to war? Some even said that if we signed an agreement and told Lebanon it can take Qana, how much will we lose? A billion dollars, two billion, or three billion? But if we go to war, how much will we lose? This was reported in the “Israeli” media.
 
In any case, the state of the entity, its fear, and weakness, as well as its preoccupation with the interior [are some of the factors that prevent it from going to war].
 
The Lebanese should know that among the factors that helped this achievement was the heroic resistance in the West Bank.
 
When we find that half of the “Israeli” army is in the West Bank, and there is a serious threat there, will it [“Israel”] initiate a war with Lebanon? What will happen to the entity? What army will fight? These factors also helped.
 
Also, among the circumstances that helped – this will surprise you – are the consequences of the American blockade on Lebanon.
 
The Americans imposed a blockade to force Lebanon to surrender and submit. The main reason for the blockade was the boundary delimitation, the oil wealth, the abandoning of the resistance, etc.
 
When Lebanon and the Lebanese people reached this difficult stage, there was a high readiness among the Lebanese people to accept high choices from the state and the resistance.
 
Perhaps if the economic and financial situation in Lebanon was better, there was prosperity, money and trade, and there were real economic projects and tourism, and people like me threatened war, the Lebanese people would say, Sayyed, where do you want to take us?
 
But the American blockade has brought the Lebanese people to a place where we no longer have a choice, and our only option is the gas and oil wealth. To restore it, we have to use force even if we had to fight a war.
 
These are factors that we must take into account. These factors certainly helped and were important. However, we come to the real reasons that we have in Lebanon. I arranged them as follows:
 
1. The steadfastness of the state: There is no doubt that it is all thanks to the leaders [the President, the Speaker, the Prime Minister]. I hope that no one will cancel anyone when it comes to this issue.
 
Regarding this issue, the decision was made in solidarity and interdependence. There is no doubt that President Aoun's toughness as well as Speaker Berri’s toughness were essential.
 
Prime Minister Najib Mikati’s solidarity was also essential. These leaders standing together as well as their courage and the toughness of the negotiator were all essential.
 
In the end of the day, there was a group of people that worked hard. Yes, it will be recorded that the agreement took place during His Excellency President Michel Aoun’s term. But this must not negate the efforts of everyone who bore the responsibility of this file from beginning to end.
 
Hence, it is thanks to the steadfastness of the state officials, the solidarity and interdependence of the leaders, their insistence and non-compromise, and their careful observations pertaining to normalization, security, recognition, etc.
 
2. The threat of the resistance and its readiness to go as far as fighting a war and sending drones because there were people in Lebanon who used to say … Anyway, you know what the Americans said.
 
3. Popular support for the official position and the position of the resistance: I believe that there was a very large popular support. Here, we are not talking about a specific sect or a specific area, but all sects in all areas.
 
This was clear and evident either by public support or by not objecting – there were large segments that did not support. It usually happens in Lebanon when people would sometimes object. Some people objected and had no logic. The resistance spoke the same logic as that of the Lebanese official position –the circumstances that the Lebanese people were living in and the options available to them are strong and solid logic.
 
Where did this support come from? It came from the people. This support was expressed by parties, forces, figures, as well as religious scholars and references from various sects. I will mention two examples and focus on them.
 
When the leadership of the Amal Movement, i.e., when Speaker Berri delivers a speech not as a Speaker of Parliament but as the head of the Amal Movement, which is a main faction in the resistance in Lebanon, and says – after the resistance issued its threat – that we will defend our water resources and our sea as we defended our land, he practically covered the threat of the resistance and stated that he is a partner in it. This is a point of strength.
 
The “Israelis” will be looking especially and directly at our Shiite environment, which will primarily bear the confrontation with the enemy if we go to the confrontation. This was a great point of strength.
 
Likewise, when the head of the Free Patriotic Movement announced the Karish-Qana equation. Perhaps it is exceptional and unfamiliar in the Lebanese milieu, even in the Christian milieu, for a Christian movement of this size to emerge and adopt an option of this kind.
 
Hence, this is a point of strength. The “Israelis” were looking at this. They were surprised by the steadfastness of the incubating environment. This environment was the one that will face the consequences and the hits if we went to war.
 
Here, I do not mean the Shiite environment only, but rather the supporting environment from the rest of the areas and sects that are showing solidarity with the resistance.
 
All this led to this result, and we cannot separate them from each other. Later, I will mention a final detail. This means that Lebanon benefited from all the elements of strength in it. The official position, the resistance, the popular position, solidarity, and unity led to this victory.
 
Of course, we do not need to infer much about this issue, which is the threat of war that was a decisive factor. But just to be precise, when we, the resistance, talk about this issue, we must mention the threat of war and the official position.
 
They went to the negotiations, worked carefully, and bore the responsibility. Popular solidarity alone cannot give results. If a person wants to use percentages, it’s their business.
 
The important thing is that there is a set of complementary and collaborative causes and factors that led to this result. Yes, the resistance is a decisive factor.
 
Also, we do not want to be flattering, but rather we must be fair. The Americans say: Fear of war led to understanding. As for the “Israelis”, there is a consensus in “Israel” regarding this issue. The opposition, including Netanyahu, express this in a manner of accusations, insults, and accusations of treason.
 
They are accusing the Lapid government of fighting, giving up, and weakening. Also, when the Lapid government wanted to infer, the most important evidence it provided to its people is that this understanding or agreement is a way to avoid war. In a more subtle way, the latter is speaking politely, while the former is accusing him of treason.
 
It is very notable that the army and the security institutions of the “Israeli’ entity agreed to support this understanding in order to avoid war and confrontation.
 
So, this threat was a decisive factor, and the “Israelis” knew that this threat was real and serious. O Lebanese, today we don’t just want to rejoice in the achievement. You should know that Lebanon was tittering on the brink of war to fulfill this achievement.
 
On that day when learning from past experiences was mentioned, we were about to go to war. But in the end and in the last moment, the “Israelis” backed down and changed their experimental extraction. They moved extraction from within Karish to extraction from the shore to the platform. So, that was a very important and decisive factor.
 
There is something I wanted to delay talking about, but let us say it and be fair.
 
In the mind of the enemy – I referred to this a little while ago – a war with Lebanon and with the resistance in Lebanon may not only remain in Lebanon but rather become a regional war.
 
It would have been a major war in which the Palestinians participated in it at home – they are basically in it already – as well as regional countries, Yemen, and the axis of resistance. where will the “Israelis” go?
 
This was one of the elements of strength that benefited Lebanon. We must recognize the truth that this is thanks to Iran, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Palestine, and everyone who belongs to this brave and solid axis.
 
We’ve taken up a lot of your time, but this occasion required it. Let me tell you something before I conclude the speech. There is something I wanted to talk about, but I will postpone it for later.
 
It has to do with the end of the term of His Excellency President Michel Aoun and talking about this stage, the relationship, the presidency, and the coming stage. However, we do not have much time. There will be more days to come, God willing, to talk about this issue.
 
Regarding this matter, Lebanon was strong, courageous, and wise. It was strong because it used all the strength it had – the state was logical and steadfast and the resistance, the state institutions, the army, and security services were all strong because everyone was on the field.
 
Secondly, it was brave because it was not afraid of American pressures or threats. I know what happened in the negotiations. It was not afraid of “Israeli” threats. It was brave to threaten war. The resistance was not the only one that threatened. The official position, practically in one way or another, adopted the threat of the resistance, even when some did not adopt it.
 
It [the Lebanese state] was wise throughout the entire process of negotiation as well as with regard to the media, political, and field management. There were no provocations or biddings. We were all just Lebanese who did not resort to arguments or mishandling.
 
When it came to politics, negotiations, and behavior on the field, everything went smoothly to achieve the required result.
 
Of course, the thing I want to conclude with is that for the “Israelis”, the position of the resistance was surprising. The Lebanese should know this.
 
We have been following their studies, conferences, and comments and assessing their position and strategic assessment for many years, especially after the July war.
 
The conviction of the enemy leadership – the political leadership, the military leadership, and the security leadership – is that the resistance in Lebanon is deterred, that Hezbollah does not dare and will not dare do anything, and that it speaks but does not act.
 
They were also betting that the social situation in Lebanon, the living situation, the economic situation, and the sharp political divisions that the enemy is benefiting from will prevent the resistance in Lebanon from going to any option that includes force. This was their estimate.
 
Therefore, when they heard the resistance say clearly that it is forbidden for them to extract from Karish before Lebanon obtains full recognition of its rights and an agreement is reached, they were shocked.
 
They did not believe it from the start. But when the drones were sent, they believed. When they saw the field preparation, they believed. Of course, there are indications and results, but time has run out and I’ve already taken up more time.
 
The following is the most important point I want to build on and direct my speech to the enemy. I would like to tell the enemy: You are mistaken if you imagine that the resistance in Lebanon is deterred. The resistance in Lebanon wants the security of Lebanon, the safety of Lebanon, and the safety of the civilians in Lebanon, all the Lebanese, and all residents and facilities in Lebanon. It acts with wisdom, knowledge, responsibility, clarity, and firmness.
 
But when great national interests require that it transcend the rules of engagement, it will not hesitate to do so, no matter what, even if it is going to war.
 
Let the enemy memorize this rule and equation because this is what it went through during the past few months was a real experience.
 
The last thing to be said is that there is a responsibility. The state will continue carrying out this responsibility the problem of the presidency and the government in the country.
 
The officials and the ministers heading their ministries must follow up on the implementation of the agreement. The relevant ministries must continue to pursue the American mediator and the French, who also had a role and helped in this matter.
 
They should call on companies, such as Total, to begin digging, excavating, and extracting because Lebanon has wasted a lot of time.
 
We must not waste more time. Hence, this needs serious follow-up, including at the legal level. We talked about laws to guarantee this money, i.e., a sovereign fund, in addition to the rest of the discussions. All this must be followed up on and communicated.
 
The last question remains: What is the guarantee later? What forced the “Israeli” enemy directly, the United States of America, the West, and everyone who worked on this file to bring matters to this point constitutes a real guarantee.
 
We must not trust the guarantees of the countries. We must trust in our God, first and foremost, and in our strength. A strong Lebanon and a strong official, popular, and resistant position are what constitute our guarantee.
 
Otherwise, the rule will remain the same. No one will be able to extract oil and gas. Even if they extract oil and gas, they will not be able to continue extracting and selling if Lebanon is prevented from extracting its oil and gas.
 
This is the title of the next stage. This must be a moral, humanitarian, jihadi, patriotic, and real commitment so that we can steer our country on the right path.
 
In any case, we thank everyone who contributed to this battle, achievement, and victory. Personally, when it was said that an agreement had been reached and that the signing would take place in Naqoura, I hoped that all the Lebanese would be fair with each other.
 
[I hoped] that this victory is celebrated nationally and not lost to disputes. It should not be approached with narrow calculations.
 
That is, I say, for example, that resistance was the only one that worked on this subject. By doing so, I am being unfair and wrong.
 
This matter should be approached fairly, and everyone who contributed, worked seriously, made sacrifices, and bore the consequences of this battle in politics, media, negotiations, and on the field must be thanked.
 
God willing, there will be more victories. In the time of victories, on this path, we can provide our country, in addition to security protection, pride, dignity, and sovereignty, the wealth that will enable it to get out of its crises. One last thing – it turns out that missiles provide [people with] bread.
 
Many happy returns, and more victories to come. May the peace, mercy, and blessings of God be upon you.

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