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July-War Secrets: Sayyed Nasrallah Commissions Berri as He Commissioned Hafez al-Assad in April 1996 (Episode 4)

July-War Secrets: Sayyed Nasrallah Commissions Berri as He Commissioned Hafez al-Assad in April 1996 (Episode 4)
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TRANSLATED from Lebanese Daily As-Safir- Local Editor

In a few days, an international obnoxious talk reached its peak, and the talking sides were ready to decapitate the Resistance no matter what the price would be... They would lure the interior to do so, offering alluring proposals to the government and provoking incitement in our country.

Many politicians hung their tongues out as the international formulas with missing and inconsiderable parts would reach Ain el Tineh after reaching the Governmental Palace first.

The fire-cease settlements only ignited more fire. The blue sky changed; even the moon changed color.

A lot happened in a week; yet, all incidents referred to a local-international Seventh Chapter (of the UN Charter, which sets out the UN Security Council's powers to maintain peace), which indicated, "Hand over the captives without a guarantee that you'll be safe."

And on the seventh day (of the July War), Lebanon wasn't relieved; neither did Lebanon make a bargain, for the international delegates had laid the foundation for the rift between the Resistance and the government, entrusting the government as the only legal negotiator; the required result was to separate the Resistance completely from the government.

MP Nabih Berri realized that playing with "states", particularly the grand ones, required patience and redirection of proposals made in Ain el Tineh. The proposals would be adjusted upon the negotiations with MP Berri and basically upon the ground developments.

Nabih Berri enjoyed redirecting policies, agreeing on certain things when others disagreed and offering solutions "for the sake of staying alive..." Here below is the fourth episode, which exposes known incidents as well as secret ones that occurred on Monday 17, Tuesday 18, and Wednesday 19, July 2006.
As more international delegates had made it to Lebanon by Monday, July 17, 2006, more massacres had been perpetrated across the country; even the Lebanese Army was now a bigger target than it had been before, whereby its sites at Beirut's marches were targeted.

It was the same international talk again, in addition to the talk of deploying deterrent, international forces in southern Lebanon that was emphasized this time by the French Premier Dominique de Villepin, who met Premier Siniora and held a ministerial meeting attended by the ministers of the Amal Movement; whereby de Villepin mentioned Resolution 1559, proposed a surveillance committee, and quickly mentioned the issue of freeing the captives, but didn't focus on this last point.

At 10:00 AM, Haj Hussein Khalil phoned me and informed me of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah's response to MP Berri's letter concerning the last proposal made in the presence of the UN Special Representative for the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559, Terje Roed-Larson and the international delegation. Sayyed Nasrallah's response was as such:

"First, I thank, again, MP Berri for his stances and the support he's shown. As we've agreed regarding the principle of consultation, we (Hizbullah) don't mind the fire cease in accordance with what MP Berri has proposed. He has the card now, and he can use it comfortably, for the ground situation is good and the initiative is ours, specifically when it comes to the "Israeli" depth.

Second, as regards the proposal of handing over the ("Israeli") captives to the government, this is absolutely impossible. As Your Excellency has said, you and we know the pursuit of the government and of Saad Hariri, who's rounding the Arab World to provoke states against us. All that he's saying is, "Hand over the captives... We're defeated."

Well, let's suppose that the defined one-month period is over when they (the "Israelis") haven't yet set our captives free; are we to have an internal war? I have the utmost preference to keep the War with "Israel" rather than to shoot a single bullet inside our country. Hereupon, the presumption of handing over both captives to the government is something we cannot accept, but we agree on the direct negotiations with the government rather than with Hizbullah, as in the case of the negotiations led by the martyred MP Rafik Hariri (the negotiations for exchanging the "Israeli" soldiers' body pieces of "the Ansariyeh Airdrop" [after the Resistance fighters had lain in ambush, gravely striking the Zionist "Shayteet Unit" that was attempting to drop soldiers.] The negotiations were actually led by Rafik Hariri and France.) In other words, the government can negotiate in public, but it has to adopt what we agree on. We can't commission them and stay apart. You see how and where Siniora is directing things.

My advice is that you report to Siniora that he must not declare any initiative without any prior agreement with us, for this is going to lead to internal political tension that does not meet with the Lebanese interest. He must not embarrass us and push us to make negative choices and stances."

As for MP Berri's response, which Haj Hassan Khalil reported to the Sayyed was:
"In the first place, I told them yesterday that I refused the proposal even before I discussed it with Hizbullah. And I used the same expression, asking about what outcome the failure of the negotiations would result in. Anyway, the last proposal I made to them was one-month fire cease and negotiations regarding the exchange carried out by the UN or the German government. Yesterday, I tried to direct them to the proposal Sayyed Hassan made on the first day as he declared the (Captivation) Operation. I believe they need to talk to us. And let's see what they'll do today. They're going to meet Siniora; yet, before they do this, I can tell the stance won't change, for the atmosphere of the international delegation, as well as of Larson; is more American than international."

Berri to Siniora: Beware "Israeli" Trap
 

On July 17, at 11:45 AM, Premier Siniora arrived in Ain el Tineh. He had cut in his meeting with the international delegation and Larson, leaving them in his office and calling MP Berri to visit him. Actually, Siniora reported to Berri that things were becoming harder, and the delegation was saying they had to bear a serious proposal so that they could speak with the "Israelis". "So I believe this is a chance for us to manage things through the UN." Siniora made the following proposal:

- First, Hizbullah hands over both "Israeli" captives to the Lebanese government.

- At the moment of retaining them, fire cease is announced, and we can add the breaking of the siege. (I haven't agreed with the international delegation on this.) 

- Negotiations with the Lebanese government through the UN take place so as to set the Lebanese captives free.

- "The military Hizbullah" withdraws to the north of Litany Region.

- "Israel" withdraws from the Shebaa Farms and Kfarchouba Hills.

- The Lebanese Army gets deployed in the (Litany) Region so as to enforce the UN Emergency Forces (UNEF).

- Reference is made to the Armistice Agreement (which took place between Lebanon and "Israel" on March 23, 1949, ratifying the international border between occupied Palestine and Lebanon as "the armistice line").

Nabih Berri: "Fouad, I understand your attempt to reach a settlement, but the data requires that we act quietly. We've paid the price, and the circumstances suit us much more now. The idea of handing over the ("Israeli") captives to the government is dangerous, and it opens the door to an internal conflict if there isn't one, so how about when "Israel" has a card to play, allowing it to obstruct the agreement. Certainly if the government hands over the captives, then "Israel" will make stronger conditions, waste time, and bring new, international elements affecting the (Lebanese) government that won't be able to confront them and will be trapped in this hard situation."
 

Berri continued, "As respects the details of what you've mentioned:
- You said they weren't committed to the breaking of the siege.
- Speaking again about Hizbullah's withdrawal to the north of Litany is an ambiguous and a big issue, about which I don't know how you talked. Have you (Siniora) discussed it in detail?"
Siniora: "Nope, but I have a vision."

Berri: "The only good thing in the proposal is the commitment of withdrawal from the Shebaa Farms and Kfarchouba Hills. (The question is: How's this going to happen? This issue needs a careful consideration.)
As for the implementation of the UN Emergency Forces (UNEF), basically I don't find a problem with the current formula - if this is to resolve the problem. Whether 3,000 or 5,000 (soldiers), it doesn't matter. Their mission and role are the most important."

Siniora left without confirming the agreement or sticking to a unified text, but he heard MP Berri's clear point of view. Then he continued his meeting with the international delegation in the Governmental Palace.

An Absolutely Loaded International Proposal
 

At 3:00 PM, the international delegation met with MP Berri, and after hearing their offer, Berri discovered that what Premier Siniora reported in the morning was not accurate; it rather included these extra points:

- The Lebanese Army's entrance to the (Litany) Region before the "Israeli" withdrawal from the Shebaa Farms and Kfarchouba Hills
- A talk of a surveillance committee in accordance with the decisions of the Group of Eight (G8) that met in Saint Petersburg
- A talk of a Palestinian-Syrian-Lebanese conference regarding the issue of the Shebaa Farms, whereby withdrawal from these Farms hasn't been decided in the first place.
- The UN's signature and ratification of the agreement (made)

Berri said that what he heard from the delegation in these sessions worried him, particularly Siniora's talk, for what they've said contradicted essentially with what Siniora reported to me in the morning." Berri added, "I felt that the remarks I offered him made me avoid a misunderstanding and a problem that could have complicated things more. All of this made me ask the delegation to go to occupied Palestine and come back to Beirut as soon as they would reach a clear, rigid vision. Then we could negotiate on clear bases. Thus, the delegation left to occupied Palestine this evening, and they're to come back to Lebanon."


Feltman: Hizbullah Captivated Both Soldiers to Jam Tribunal's Work!

MP Berri met the Iranian Ambassador Muhammad Reda Shibani and the American Ambassador (Jeffery Feltman). Feltman began his talk with a new analysis including the accusation of Hizbullah as the side responsible for the Captivation Operation and its consequent incidents so that people forgot the assassination of Premier Rafik Hariri and the probability of accusing Syria; jamming, thus, the work of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL)!

Denouncing this talk, Berri interrupted Feltman, "This is not the analysis of the ambassador of a grand country; it rather looks like the analysis of some Lebanese sides. Do not keep talking like that, and I guarantee you that we'll be back to the National Dialogue in a week, sustaining, therefore, the talk about the STL in accordance with what we agreed on while holding the Dialogue sessions.
After the meeting, MP Berri told us that Feltman wasn't eager to cease fire, unlike when he had spoken to Berri "and unlike what he had requested earlier. This time he apologized for not accepting the formula I offered."

In the meantime, the parliamentary "Future Party" held a meeting, issuing a statement with a direct hint that Hizbullah should not invest the battle in achieving political gains; the statement was pressing so as to make Hizbullah accept the solutions Premier Siniora was suggesting. This, in fact, was a political escalation that served for imposing the formula that had been rejected for more than a reason. Weirdly enough, too, MP Saad Hariri made contradictory stances, calling for punishing "the adventurers" who created "a catastrophe" in Lebanon; afterwards, Saad Hariri considered that the priority was to unite the stance and refuse the Aggression!

On the night of July 17, we kept up with the ground developments; the Amal Movement and the Civil Defense of "Ar-Risala Scouts" offered three martyrs. Also, a group of ground arrangements was ratified, providing reinforcement for the Amal men in the South.

Furthermore, there was more than a comment on the American stance exposed by (former U.S. President) George W. Bush upon the malfunction of the microphone used in Saint Petersburg; while Bush was talking to Toni Blair (former United Kingdom Prime Minster), he objected on the wish of Kofi Annan (The UN's seventh Secretary General) to cease fire, saying that Syria had to stop Hizbullah from this "shit". As for Blair, he answered, "We must press (on Syria) and provide international forces in this Region (the Middle East) to make this happen.

July 18: Hariri's, Geagea's Different Tone 

The next day (July 18, 2006), the "Israeli" massacres increased, and it became more obvious that the Lebanese Army was basically targeted, whereby the Army offered more martyrs. This atmosphere, in addition to the developments of the battle field, made some sides try to adjust their political stance - at least publicly; for instance, MP Saad Hariri declared that fire cease was the priority, "and afterwards we'll discuss whose responsibility it is." Even the chief of "the Lebanese Forces" Samir Geagea changed a stance that he had announced in the morning and said that it wasn't time for evaluation, but the time for the unity of the Lebanese stance.

That was accompanied by the beginning of a change in the "Israeli" internal situation, whereby it appeared that the intensive missile launchings against the "Israeli" cities had altered the talk about finishing the Resistance into weakening it.

On the morning of the same day (July 18), MP Berri got a call from the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al- Maliki, who offered what he could do to help. Afterwards, the Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh called, informing MP Berri that he had called for an urgent Arab summit to consolidate with Lebanon and help it.

Yet, MP Berri's answer was, "The Arabs aren't going to agree to hold the summit before a week from now in order to offer "Israel" a chance to continue demolishing Lebanon." Upon this stance, Saleh merely said, "We'll wait until Saturday; otherwise, I'll offer Yemen's capacities to Lebanon."
Well, the important thing is that the summit wasn't held, and MP Berri was more convinced it was never going to be held in such circumstances.
The 18th of July passed without a notable political progress, whereby everyone was anticipating the arrival of the International delegation from Tel Aviv. As for the meeting of the Ministerial Council, which Siniora headed in a quiet atmosphere, it focused on the targeting of the Army.
Word was unified without any alternations.

On the same day, MP Berri held talks with General Michele Aoun (Head of "the Free Patriotic Movement"), who had made a good stance on the Resistance and its right, declaring that the people the Resistance represented could not be exterminated. On the other hand, MP Walid Jumblatt declared, "Let Sayyed Nasrallah allow me to say this: The choice of peace or war isn't uniquely his, and there's no difference between "the Taef Agreement" (Literally "the National Reconciliation Accord"; 1989) and Resolution 1559."
The day was over as new bloody massacres were perpetrated and useless (political) comments were made, so MP Berri said, "I wish politicians stopped making skeptical declarations at such time; that could have been the biggest service to offer."

July 19: International Delegation Isn't Coming Back
 

On Wednesday, July 19 (the eighth day of the War), MP Berri went to office so as to issue a statement, strongly denouncing the bias of the Security Council for "Israel".

Haj Hussein Khalil called, informing me that Colonel Wissam al-Hassan (the chief of the Information Branch) had discussed solution formulas with him. Haj Hassan informed him that any political discussion was to be with MP Berri, who discussed proposals and gave his opinion in regard to them. Thus, al- Hassan replied that Hariri offered new proposals to MP Berri.

So Haj Hussein answered, "We've discussed with MP Berri the ideas suggested by the international delegation. And if the "Israelis" are in no hurry, then we're not in a hurry either. Hereupon, we're going to wait for what the delegation (headed by Larson) is going to inform MP Berri of as it comes back from occupied Palestine.

The Lebanese-Army Commander, General Michele Suleiman (now the Lebanese President) arrived and spoke about the targeting of the Army and its centers, again calling for the necessity of calling Hizbullah to keep Choueifat Region away from the battle in order to avoid any critical situation in this region of Druze.
At 2:00 PM, MP Berri knew that the UN delegation that had gone to occupied Palestine to show the Lebanese point of view was not going to come back to Lebanon. And that was a clear indicator regarding the failure of the assignment or the covering up of war expansion, as well as offering a chance to the enemy to continue demolishing (Lebanon). Besides, we knew that fire was shot near the international delegation while it was passing, but no media means mentioned that.

Premier Siniora phoned MP Berri, asking him about what was happening to the delegation, so MP Berri said, "I don't know." As for Pedersen (The UN Representative), who was asked by Siniora, too, he answered:

- The international delegation isn't coming back to Beirut.
- "Israel" accepts no fire cease as it is expecting to win the War.
- "Israel" requests that Hizbullah be disarmed along 20 kilometers.
- The Lebanese Army must be deployed in the South.
- Currently, no discussion concerning the Lebanese captives is to take place.
- Talks can still be held during the War.

This, in fact, expressed the international delegation's stance before it went to occupied Palestine, and we became more certain that we were facing a front where local, Arab, and international roles perfected each other and that the situation needed further attention now.

The Sayyed Commissions His Excellency
 

I hadn't seen my family for a long time, so I went visiting them at night. Haj Hussein Khalil phoned me, asking if he could arrive in Ain el Tineh, so I arranged for his visit and went back quickly: As soon as I got there, The Haj commenced exposing new and good military data, which confirmed that the Resistance was causing casualties to "Israel" and confusing it. As well, Hizbullah's morale was great, and Sayyed Hassan was more comfortable than any other day since the beginning of the War.

"The Sayyed wants to add to what we said days ago that several calls concerning the negotiations have started, and His Eminence asks you to deal with the sides taking part in the negotiations, commissioning you for being his committed speaker. Only once before, the Sayyed gave this commissioning to the gone (Syrian) President Hafez al-Assad (in April 1996)." Haj Hussein Khalil then pointed out that the Sayyed might speak out soon.
MP Berri thanked the Sayyed again and exposed to Haj Hussein the political outcome of the day (July 19), as well as the negative evaluation of the negotiations path, which only the Resistance's important and actual military development could compensate for.

The fifth episode will include

"Israel" Introduces for Ground Invasion; Quartet Meeting in Dar el Fatwa; French Foreign Minister in Beirut Again; International Atmosphere Unchanged.


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