The Army Leadership Is Witnessing the Decline Of “Israel”: Halevi Is Desperate to Solve the Hezbollah Problem

By Ali Haidar | Al-Akhbar Newspaper

As Herzi Halevi assumes the post of chief of staff of the “Israeli” military, a host of questions are arising about his and his predecessors’ strategic thinking. Question marks are also hanging over the experiences from which they derived their operational concepts, including those related to Lebanon’s Hezbollah.

Individuals within the “Israeli” military leadership have a variety of experiences, but many of the names have a direct connection to the Lebanese arena or the battles fought by the resistance against the “Israeli” army.

That said, one of the more prominent characteristics of the “Israeli” military’s top brass in recent decades, including the chiefs of staff, is that they don’t have first-hand experiences of the victories that “Israel” scored in its early days. Instead, their knowledge in this field is limited to what they read in books and documents.

Their experiences are built in parallel to the rise of the resistance in Lebanon and Palestine and the decline of the “Israeli” military’s superiority. In other words, they are witnesses to “Israel’s” downward spiral and their army’s diminishing functionality.

In light of this, it is natural for field experiences to contribute to the formulation of strategic and operational concepts by senior army officers, either in the direction of exaggerated confidence that leads to military adventures, or the recognition of reality and the limits of power despite its reliance on technological, military, and destructive superiority.

This is applicable to the 23rd Chief of Staff of the “Israeli” army, Herzi Halevi, who joined the military establishment in 1985, the year of the “Israeli” retreat from the occupied Lebanese territories towards the security belt. The ensuing decline of the “Israeli” military peaked in 2000.

This is what inhabits Halevi's consciousness, who must continue to adapt the army and its capabilities to the escalating challenges and threats in “Israel's” regional and operational environment, particularly in confronting Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Yagil Levy, a researcher in army and society relations, points out to Haaretz newspaper that Halevi “is not a general seeking to activate force, nor is he the general who will lead the political establishment to the path of peace.”

He explains that the most important feature of Halevi’s strategic thinking is that “he understands the limitations of activating force,” which is the most important concept that distinguishes political and military leaders from each other, especially since any error in diagnosing it may contribute to “Israel's” being involved in or avoiding scenarios that negatively affect its national security.

This is the most important lesson that the “Israeli” army learned from the consequences of the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and from many confrontations with Hezbollah in the years that followed.

The starting point for the decision to invade stemmed from the conviction that “Israel” is capable of combining a secure occupation with the establishment of a loyal political authority in Lebanon. However, the results were disastrous and spelled the beginning of “Israel's” downward spiral.

While serving as the head of “Israel’s” Galilee Division (2011-2013), which is tasked with securing the frontier with Lebanon, Halevi gave a rare interview to The New York Times.

"I don't think there is the war or the operation that will solve the problem,” he said in reference to Lebanon. 

These remarks sum up his experience and the experiences of many army leaders while revealing the extent to which the resistance in Lebanon succeeded in searing the consciousness of the “Israeli” military’s leadership after many years of determination, steadfastness, and planning.

The language of exclusion and elimination that Halevi used reflects his views and highlights the collective despair in the political, military, and intelligence institutions over the prospects of a settlement with Hezbollah.

As such, the state of deterrence established by the party [Hezbollah] was crystallized. Accordingly, “Israel” avoided major military adventures for more than 16 years. Avoiding military confrontation turned into a priority that governed “Israel’s” decisions and choices.

We must emphasize that Hezbollah, in turn, does not seek military confrontations for its own sake, as long as the existing equation provides an umbrella and security for Lebanon and the resistance.

“Israel’s” content with this situation may be disturbed by scenarios like the war in Syria, during which Halevi acknowledged the conviction that Hezbollah was busy confronting the takfiri threat in Syria and Lebanon, which was supposed to constitute a strategic opportunity for “Israel”.

However, the “Israeli” army was deterred from embarking on a military adventure due to the resistance’s deterrent messages, which culminated in threats against an “Israeli” ammonia facility and the Dimona reactor.

Hence, Halevi’s position (2011-2013) in which he acknowledged “Israel’s” limited capabilities to solve its problem in Lebanon was made before the emergence of precision weapons (missiles and drones), which turned into the main factor in the deterrence equation and the fulcrum in establishing new power equations and a more dangerous path.

Therefore, Halevi explains in the same interview that the “Israeli” ambition is to create a longer gap between the wars with Hezbollah, a position shared by all the military and political leadership.

It reflects an explicit acknowledgment of the party's success in establishing new rules and concepts that altered “Israel's” view of itself and its enemies and established a firm conviction in the consciousness of its leaders of a radical change in the regional environment, at the level of enemies and the nature of the threats, with the success of the resistance in robbing it of its decisiveness and its ability to win in the traditional sense.

Even scrutiny of many maneuvers and scenarios reveals that “Israel’s” current aspirations, which are by no means guaranteed success, involve victory by points over the resistance. Hezbollah would respond to any such provocations by destroying “Israeli” strategic facilities with precision missiles and drones and using its fighters to storm “Israeli” army posts and settlements in the north where the topography is rapidly changing along the border with Lebanon as the “Israelis” hope to find natural and artificial barriers aimed at obstructing those advances.