The Saudi-US Relation Is More Than Just A Personal Affair

Translated by Staff, Al-Akhbar Newspaper

When the US decides to launch a counter-strike on the Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed Bin Salman [MBS], after he brutally hit the Western interests, this goes beyond an American threat to impose sanctions as banning arms exports to Saudi Arabia or withdrawing hundreds of personnel from bases in the Kingdom. The American move, which is still being formulated with no leaks, carries many possibilities, though optimism leads some opponents to say the US will attempt to take the Kingdom itself from the clutches of the troubled prince because it is “too valuable” to be left in the hands of “enemies”.

According to some Saudi Officials, MBS seems to be confused about the blurry future of the Saudi relations with the US and the West especially after verbally reducing the tone of the Saudi stance towards Russia’s military operation in Ukraine. In a nutshell, the US is still the main security cover for the Saudi regime, politically and military, at this historical time of reconsidering the relations and its further conclusions. For instance, this is compared to major foundational stations just like when the founder of Saudi Arabia, Abdulaziz Al Saud replaced the British patronage with an American one in the 1940s.

The main question posed: Is MBS’s problem with the America as a whole or its left-wing Democratic party only? Subsequently, what is the form of relations the US wants with not only Saudi Arabia but also with Gulf states which is considered as American vassal states based on linking the interests of ruling families and the main tribes in these countries to those relations? MBS was able, by enticement or intimidation, to ally with the UAE and Kuwait in his conflict with Washington Democrats. He considers the change of the Democratic Party’s policy towards the Gulf regimes as the flame of the current crisis. Thus, the mentioned regimes are afraid of the security vacuum the US would leave in the region, which will consequently put them under an existential threat.

By the same token, the Crown Prince launched a campaign beyond Saudi borders to defend Gulf interests, to be visualized by his supporters as the guard of the independence of the Arab / Islamic decision-making. Likewise, Saudi allies started a public mobilization to influence the outcome of the November US congressional midterm elections, as evidenced by Riyadh’s statement that Biden Administration had asked them to delay the production cutback for a month until after the elections. Then, they promoted American press reports about a Republican move to expose what they considered an attempt to use foreign relations to achieve partisan interests in the elections.

However, the margin of the Republican move to benefit electorally from the decision to reduce oil production is limited by investing in the American popular discontent with the huge inflation caused by the raise of the oil prices. Besides, it can never turn into an open alliance with MBS’ regime because the reduction in production harms consumers, the economy, and national interests of the US and the West as it is considered as a cooperation with Russia in the “Ukrainian war”. Indeed, no one publicly defends MBS, even among Republicans, for they can’t oppose Biden’s measures against the Kingdom and the Crown Prince. Likewise, Saudi opposition can’t stand against the decision to cut oil production since it is a Saudi national interest, regardless of MBS’ takeoffs which are mostly personal.

Adding to that, the policy of withdrawing from areas of tension, especially the Middle East, and reducing the costs of the military deployment aboard, which Biden assured in his latest interview with the CNN. During the interview, the US President said that the main goal of the Jeddah meetings was finding a way out of the Middle East is a general American policy that is decided by the state and all its relevant institutions, and it takes place after in-depth study.

Republicans may be more strident than Democrats; as the former president, Donald Trump, threatened to leave Germany, South Korea and Japan, and to withdraw from the NATO. Trump also extruded Patriot systems from Saudi Arabia and refused to get involved in its defense from the Aramco attack in September 2019, even if he sent 500 American soldiers to reassure it. Yet, Trump views army deals with Saudi Arabia as profitable and shouldn’t be left for China or Russia, so, he is ready, at a price, to stand by MBS if he faces internal problems. This phenomenon – the Trump phenomenon – who completely turned his back on advice from the Pentagon, State Department, and intelligence agencies on the relationship with the Kingdom is hard to be repeated.

As for the Biden Administration, there’s no doubt that supporting the Saudi opposition growing from suppression is one of the pillars of the new policy prepared by the national security team. Even though, some Saudi opponents felt disappointed and gloated over Biden’s July visit to Jeddah saying it was a surrender to MBS. Some opposition accounts on twitter such as “Rajul al Dawla” [the statesman] – known for his support for former Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Nayef who is imprisoned by the current crown prince – affirmed that the US treats MBS as the “useful fool” who will be replaced when the harm to its interests is greater than its benefit.

Even so some estimates, especially in the Gulf states, assume that Americans can not do much against Riyadh, the democratic uprising to demand revenge revenge against MBS and to replace the diplomatic language that was used before in times of dispute with a language of public attacks and threats refer to something different. This indicates that the expected measures will be tough against MBS, and will be a correction to the “mistake” of visiting Saudi Arabia and meeting the Crown Prince, which exposed Biden to widespread criticism within his party. In a similar fashion, deputies and sheikhs attempted to introduce petitions and prepared draft legislation to convince the US President to adopt a strict policy towards the Kingdom.

Though, harming American and Western interests triggers the administration to initiate a big maneuver against MBS, as one of the available choices is imposing personal sanctions on him in the case of the assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Back then, American politicians exerted efforts to convince their public opinion to exclude the Crown Prince from sanctions imposed on dozens of Saudis involved in the assassination, noting that the US Intelligence held him directly responsible for the assassination.

The goal behind the exception, at that time, was to keep doors open for him to find a formula for dealing with the man, but his alliance with “enemies” as explained in the American context makes the exception unjustified. Therefore, such a measure may obstruct MBS’ ascension to the throne after the death of his father, knowing that it did not happen in the history of relations that the head of the Saudi state was subject to US sanctions.

Many in the Gulf compare MBS’ decision to reduce oil production with King Fiasal’s decision to impose an oil embargo on the West during the October 1973 war. However, some opponents are liking his defiant attitude towards Washington to that of Saddam Hussein. Regardless of describing what the man is doing in practice, it appears, at least so far, that his future will not be promising.