When ’Israel’ Loses the Initiative on the Battlefield

By Ibrahim Al-Amin / Al-Akhbar Newspaper

Translated by Staff

No one in the “Israeli” entity expected the resistance in Gaza to respond the way it did. All the forecasts and expectations lost credibility when rockets were launched towards Al-Quds, shortly after the leader of the Qassam Brigades, Abu Khaled Al-Deif, issued his threat.

This point alone embodies the main title of the crisis in “Israel”; the crisis of the political, military, and intelligence psychology; the crisis of uncertainty about what might emanate from the other side. It is the same crisis that existed with Lebanon for many years, and it worsened with Gaza a few years ago. Its scope was unveiled with the outbreak of the recent military confrontation.

The first thing is the resistance initiated the war. From where? From the besieged Gaza Strip that’s deprived of its livelihood and pressured militarily, and politically by most of the governments in the region and the world. It is also facing new crises due to the worsening economic situation and the health crisis brought on by the coronavirus pandemic. Moreover, there are political challenges related to the Palestinian elections. It is a strip that includes Islamic movements facing the most complex campaign in which many countries and its elites interfere.

The enemy did not expect the Gaza Strip to take such a step. If it had the lowest security or political esteem, it would have acted in a different way in managing the aggression against Al-Quds and the neighborhoods of the Arab city. It would have set up a military plan that would have given it an additional margin. However, the Gaza Strip initiated a qualitative step that deprived the enemy of its most valuable asset – the element of surprise resulting from its superiority in initiating wars. From here, all the enemy had to do is watch the performance of the resistance in Gaza to realize that it needed different calculations on the rest of the fronts with the resistance. This is especially true for the Lebanese front where the resistance learned a lot from the recent confrontation in Gaza, reevaluating many matters regarding confrontation with the enemy, not related to traditional deterrence, but rather to the combat doctrine based on the principle of defensive and preemptive attack.

Faced with what Gaza had done, the enemy was bombarded with a torrent of surprises. It is not only related to the ability of the resistance to launch salvos of missiles that strike targets deep within enemy territory. Rather, the Palestinian response to the rocket fire went beyond ceremonial solidarity, as they usually do, to the limits of direct engagement in a confrontation that broke all the monotony that had occurred over a decade in the West Bank and the 1948 territories. The enemy did not expect that a new generation of Palestinians would emerge in popular movements interspersed with violent protests against the occupation forces.

Within a few days, "Israel" was facing a different kind of crisis – the inability to control the Palestinian scene in the West Bank, where the Palestinian Authority cannot rely on repression, and knows that its problems are mounting as an authority cooperating with the occupation.

The same situation developed in the 1948 territories, where all the traditional leadership elements have failed to curb the popular movements. Moreover, the enemy saw an insurgency in the 1948 territories that have the potential to evolve further than anyone thinks. This explicitly refers to the failure of the containment policy that was practiced during the last decade, whether by the occupation forces or by Palestinian leaders who abandoned the struggle and chose to settle, expressing their inability to bear the requirements of resistance. This is the case with many of the 1948 leaders and forces. It is not only limited to the Southern Islamic Movement group. Rather, the state of stagnation hit leftist and Arab nationalist forces and figures who seemed to have little in the way of appreciation, and foresight.

Faced with this scene, “Israel” found itself before a perennial question: What can be done?

All the talk about the enemy's attempts to achieve military victories in the Gaza Strip express a lack of understanding of the reality of the existing equations in Palestine and its surroundings. And all those that talk about the enemy's supernatural capabilities pushing the resistance factions to withdraw are still living in the past that will never return.

Any talk about the enemy's ability to invert the field equation does not possess an understanding of the reality of what has changed on the ground in the last seven years. This means that the enemy only had the strategy of punishment and the policy of making the resistance as well as the Palestinian people in all the areas pay a high price. Gaza was severely hit, and protesters in the West Bank were severely beaten with the aim of killing them. This in addition to the widespread campaign of random arrests.

In the 1948 territories, the enemy tried to create a balance of terror by unleashing mobs of settlers, which operated in parallel with widespread arrests that included all activists and participants in the protests.

Since the second day of military confrontations, “Israel” faced the dilemma of directing exceptional strikes to the resistance cadres in the Gaza Strip. The element of surprise, which came this time from the Gaza Strip, starved the enemy's military and security target bank. The resistance – despite the losses inflicted on the leadership of the Qassam and the Al-Quds Brigades – showed the ability to organize a silent evacuation and reorganize the communication network between the combat groups. The technical team succeeded in connecting all those who were cut off, in organizing the mobilization of fighters for any ground confrontation, in organizing the launching of missiles in a way that simulates the provision of stocks in locations capable of rapid movement, and in using what was installed long before the outbreak of the confrontation.

The enemy's failure to stop the offensive military operations and missile strikes is nothing but an indication of a major defect that will be reflected through a crisis in the leadership – at the military and security levels – of the occupation forces.

All the tongue-lashing the “Israelis” directed against the Egyptians – that they have not made sufficient efforts to prevent the smuggling of materials that helped the resistance build an unprecedented force – will not work here. The enemy knows that the various capabilities of the resistance did not all go out to battle, and they remain dependent on a field path that imposes itself on everyone.

In practice, the enemy has nothing left but to escalate the battle of "paying the price." Practically, it is a futile policy, because it has not achieved its goal of restraining and deterring the resistance and preventing it from continuing to launch missiles.

It is also not effective in inciting the social base of resistance against these groups. On the contrary. As each time, and perhaps more than before, the opposite is true. As the public interacted inside and outside Palestine, and in the whole world, with the manifestations of “Israeli” crimes, which in the coming days will reveal the extent of its influence on the decisions of many governments, forces, and destinations in the world, including those that reject the logic of resistance in the first place.

We are now on the threshold of a new phase of confrontation. The enemy will come out declaring victory, as every time. However, we will soon hear the political and non-political screams from all of the entity’s institutions. The enemy's military and security leaders will have to sit for long weeks trying to understand what happened and foresee how to act in the next stage.

As for the political level, all its maneuvers will not work, as its external crises are greater than the internal ones. And for those who do not know, "Israel" pays great attention to the Western position regarding its actions. The enemy's leaders know that the West was not at all impressed by both its military and political performance. As for the Arab allies, who repeated their actions during the July 2006 war by inciting the enemy to continue the war, they will feel the disastrous results. Although no qualitative changes are expected in their position, they are likely to alter their action, although not voluntarily.