Liberation: American Style

Amer Mohsen - Al-khbar

Without downplaying the ongoing political events in Baghdad, we must not forget that Iraq is in a state of war, with many variables developing behind the scenes, including the return of a direct US military presence.

When trying to determine the future of Iraq, the complexities of the war, its consequences and the path towards "liberating Mosul" may be no less important than the crisis gripping Baghdad's political system.

After a visit to Iraq, researcher, Kenneth Pollack, wrote a three part report about "the US war against Daesh [Arabic acronym for "ISIS" / "ISIL"]" and a plan to liberate Mosul. Pollack mainly writes about military affairs. In 2002, he published a reference book about the Arab armies and their performance in war. However, after the events of September 11 [2001] and the invasion of Iraq, he moved away from the field of pure academic research and approached the fields of military and political decision-making in the US. He also has several precedent advisory reports on Iraq during the occupation. For a period of time he was also the director of the "Brookings" Institute in Washington.

Pollack claims that one of the most important events, not covered in the media, is the American success in the construction of a Western campaign against Daesh in Iraq. Based on his observations and interviews with Iraqi and American officers, the researcher says that over the past year, the US has trained and equipped, six Iraqi army brigades [officially dubbed "Mosul's counter-attack brigades"], that fight under US supervision, and constitute the force which the US-led coalition wants to use to regain Mosul. Pollack asserts that these brigades have exercised a superior performance to the rest of the Iraqi units, and were the ones who recently fought to liberate Ramadi, "raising their status and the influence of the United States [in Iraq]".

According to Pollack, some of these units "that the coalition retrained and reequipped" and are fighting under the supervision of American advisers [and participation], were deployed to the north for the anticipated battle of Nineveh. Pollack estimates that if the Western alliance made Mosul its priority and Daesh's defenses in the west of the Euphrates continue to weaken, the alliance might enter the city within six months to a year from today.

According to the researcher's analysis this "expected success" of the coalition's plan rests on three key factors:

1- Daesh's increasing weakness after two years of airstrikes and fighting on more than one front, and casualties that would usually reach up to more than 60 percent of their forces during each attack [Pollack says that due to the losses, Daesh was not able to launch a large large-scale attack in almost a year - since it took over Palmyra and Ramadi].

2- US training and equipping as well as the growing engagement of US forces in the battle. Pollack admits that the actual number of US forces in Iraq is not 3800 "advisors" as Washington claims, but more than five thousand soldiers and officers.

3- The alliance's change in the rules of engagement and bombing. Airstrikes were no longer limited to targets approved by the Iraqi army, instead fighter jets began freely bombing and "clearing areas for the Iraqi formation even if it was in smaller attacks."

On the other hand, some of the facts raise question mark about Pollack's analysis and assumptions, both in regard to the weakness of Daesh and its approaching end as well as the efficiency of the forces and militias trained by the US. Only days ago, in Talsaqaf north of Mosul, Daesh terrorist managed to launch a surprise attack against Kurdish units, and infiltrated behind the Peshmerga lines using mobile bridges to overcome the defensive trenches. A US Navy, Special Forces soldier was killed in the attack [interestingly the Kurdish forces on the front, which the Americans trained and armed, fled and left their American advisers to be besieged by Daesh militants. The advisors were later rescued by hovercraft].

In addition, Pollack asserts that the primary means in "Liberating" Iraqi cities, according to the American scenario, is to use air power extensively, and the role of the ground force is primarily to advance and take over the rubble left behind.

This claim reminds us of an interview with, one of the leaders of the "popular mobilization units", Qais al-Khazali, during which he was asked about the liberation of Ramadi with the significant contribution of the Western air force; an example used by Pollack. At the time, al-Khazali laughed, wondering why Iraqi flags were not raised atop a government building or a house, signaling that there were no buildings left in the city. Khazali cited a number of statistics showing that the proportion of destruction in Ramadi had reached 90 percent while the infrastructure was completely destroyed, similar to the second battle of Fallujah in 2004.

Khazali compares this case to the liberation of Tikrit where the number of destroyed buildings did not exceed 300 [out of more than 22 thousand buildings in the city]. Classes at the University of Tikrit resumed weeks after Daesh left the city. However, residents of Ramadi will not find anything to come back to or the possibility of life in their city after it was "liberated" [noting that a large number of Ramadi residents, before and after the battles, were hostile to Daesh and were fighting it].

The irony here is that the Arab media, which launched an anti-Iraqi campaign and incited internal Iraqi strife, will not mind that Mosul be "liberated" this way and by the Americans; It prefers that Mosul be destroyed by the US airstrikes rather than controlled by the popular mobilization units which have liberated tens of thousands of kilometers, protected Baghdad, seized Salahaddine, and is the only force confronting the expansion of Barzani and his militias.

We can surely say that if Fallujah was ‘freed' under US supervision and jets flattened the whole city, Washington will silence its allies and the Gulf's media and educated people will rest.

Basically, the front is not only in Baghdad, and it is impossible to separate the political situation from the great battle the country is facing. This as the US returns to Iraq with its soldiers and forms its brigades within the Iraqi army and plans military campaigns that could end - if things go according to plan for the Americans - and Daesh has left northern Iraq, however Nineveh is left behind divided and destroyed [even Pollack admits that Washington does not have an administrative and reconstruction plan after entering Mosul].

In this context, the situation in Iraq and many of our countries, fit Donald Trump's saying: "Before we disagree on the affairs of our country, we must first have a homeland."

Translated and Edited by website team