US Secretary of State holds dialogue with Damascus, Mouallem heads to Muscat

Nahed Hatter

The regional and international scene appears like a painting with colors mixed and overlapping together; however, this is what is occurring in a moment shared between two phases and two regional systems.

After the two greatest powers reached an understanding, and following the US-Iranian and Saudi-Russian dialogues respectively surrounding the new regional order in the Middle East, a secret Syrian-American dialogue recently began; it is true that they are taking place at a low diplomatic level, yet they have now bypassed Iraqi mediators and security mediations, taking the form of a political dialogue initiated by diplomats from the US State Department.

This dialogue is taking place based on the [US] recognition of the fait accompli in Syria: there is no alternative to President Bashar al-Assad's regime, no alternative to dialogue with him, dialogue not regarding internal political affairs, but about coordinating efforts to combat terrorism, the future of the Kurdish question, and the fighters that are not classified as terrorists etc.

While US Secretary of State John Kerry continues talks regarding the immunity of President Assad from any political solution in Syria, Kerry's aides conduct detailed discussions with their Syrian counterparts.

The Americans have agreed to expand the scope of the strikes against terrorist organizations, to include, in addition to ‘Daesh', ‘the Nusra Front' and its allies.

This is a political victory for Damascus, which has long faced the risk of the revitalization of the ‘Nusra Front' under the pretext of it being part of the "moderate opposition". With this, 80 percent of combat forces opposed to the Syrian army are now targets under the Syrian-American understanding. This lays what could be described as the foundation stones for the regional alliance - proposed by Russia - against terrorism.

As for other fighters, whether local forces or those linked directly to western and gulf intelligence agencies, possible solutions are being explored, including the integration of elements from the ‘Free Army' into the Syrian army or ‘Popular Defense Forces'.

Ironically, Washington is now closer to Damascus than Ankara, which has not cut its strong links to terrorist organizations, and which exploits the war on terror to strike the PKK, while in contrast, [Turkey's] Syrian branch is an ally of both the Syrians and Americans. Furthermore, the Turkish president, Recep Tayyep Erdogan, will soon face two choices; either that he really - not merely with lip service - joins the alliance against terrorism, or he risks losing the political cover [he currently enjoys] to counter the PKK, and [Erdogan] will have to confront his fate within Turkey.

The American statement on providing air cover for "the moderate opposition" is actually aimed at the ‘Nusra Front', ‘Daesh', and Turkey, and not the Syrians; as for the announcement that included the Syrian army amongst those who are potential targets by the US, this is a mixture of political incitement and for political consumption.

This assessment is based on a vague US approval for a safe zone in the north of Syria; did it even occur, and does it have any practical translation on the battlefield, or then transforming it a camp site as part of a settlement for the issue of the fighters who are not part of ‘Daesh', or the ‘Nusra Front' and its allies? After all, any step in this direction will not occur except with by coordination with Syria.

In the meantime, the Syrian foreign minister Walid Mouallem received an official invitation from his Omani counterpart, Yousuf bin Alawi, to visit Muscat for bilateral talks aimed at paving the way for Mouallem to meet with his Saudi counterpart, Adel al-Jubeir. A three-way meeting may occur during the visit itself.

Oman's initiative comes in the framework of the speeding up of the path towards a solution, whose clear headings became clear during the meeting in Doha involving the Saudis, Americans, and Russians, the day before yesterday; the meeting does not conflict with, but rather complements the amended Iranian initiative, which is being discussed by the Iranian, Syrian, and Russian trio in Tehran. The launch of this initiative may be the beginning of the end of the war on Syria.

These are the broad headings that sum up the next phase: war against takfirist terrorism and its annihilation, delineating the limits of the Muslim Brotherhood, collective security, the reduction of geopolitical and sectarian conflicts, reaching compromises for hot issues, and international and regional cooperation for reconstruction efforts.

In summary, the failure to isolate Iran, and bring down Syria, Hizbullah, the Houthis, and the [political] movement in Bahrain, has led to the acceptance of the new balance in the new regional system, which recognizes the influence of Russia and its interests in the region, and Iran as a key regional power, and the Syrian army and Hizbullah as the main partnership in the fight against terrorist organizations and ensuring regional security.

In Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the UAE can declare ‘victory' after the military advance in Aden, and thereafter engage in negotiations to reach a balanced political solution. This will in fact be a settlement between Riyadh and the Houthis, who will be recognized as a leading nationalist power in the Republic of Yemen. During the process of the settlement of the Syrian and Yemeni files, the Prime Minister of Bahrain, Khalifa Bin Salman, who represents a major obstacle towards national reconciliation, will find himself obliged to resign, opening the door for a political formula close to the Kuwaiti model.

The deputy Crown Prince, the Saudi defense minister Mohammed bin Salman, did not hesitate to visit his Jordanian ally, to inform him that the game is over! The activities of the ‘Mok' intelligence room that is active in southern Syria will be frozen, and there will begin a battlefield and political separation between its affiliated organizations, and fighters belonging to the ‘Nusra Front', over which the lid has been lifted.

Amman, which has not take any clear stances so far towards the settlement over Iran's nuclear program and the subsequent reactions and developments, may have received the green light to maneuver in the context of the settlement. The Jordanian government has something to offer Damascus, in the security, logistical, and commercial areas. It hopes, in return, that there is reconciliation [with Syria], and a solution to the problem of Syrian refugees in Jordan. It is a problem faced by Lebanon as well; however, it is noticeable that Lebanese forces, with the exception of Hizbullah, lie outside the equations and talks.

In the midst of these developments, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov found the time and felt the need to receive the head of the political bureau of Hamas, Khaled Meshaal, to send two messages. Firstly, to international and regional powers, that Moscow is committed to the Palestinian cause, which was put on the shelf since the beginning of the ‘Arab Apring', and the other was addressed to Hamas, on the need to re-examine its positions towards all the developments in the region, especially in Egypt.

Source: Al-Akhbar Newspaper, Translated and Edited by website team