Iranian-Saudi Rapprochement Calms Lebanon...How about Syria?
Sami Kleib - al-Akhbar newspaper
The principle success of the security plan in the north Lebanon city of Tripoli, and the formation of the Lebanese government before, raised several questions on whether it is all the fruit of a local agreement or the reverberation of a regional détente.
According to information al-Akhbar has obtained, the Iranian-Saudi tension is candidate to mitigation if primary contacts on agreeing over common points succeed. Therefore, there will be security in Lebanon and there will be agreement over a new president of the republic. As to Syria, the situation is still intricate, in the best case scenario.
Hizbullah's Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah has said dangerous words in his interview with As-Safir newspaper. With his usual meticulousness, he drew the map of the present and the features of the future that is promising to the camp he belongs to. He said he supported a Saudi-Iranian rapprochement despite the "negative" role by Saudi Arabia. Simultaneously, Interior Minister, Nohad Mashnouq announced that Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon was about to return to the country after the primary success of the security plan. Apparently, something is being cooked behind closed doors; something that starts with the Iranian-western agreement and lands between the Islamic Republic and KSA.
What's in the information?
Information speak of a primary two-pronged Iranian-Saudi meeting, away from the limelight. Some even speak of more than just one encounter. It is in the interest of both parties to keep silent as long as the climate is not as positive as required. Contacts are underway only to test the pulse. There are no violations in Syria, unlike in Lebanon. Reaching happy end in terms of the nuclear dossier and ending Syria war are two priorities for Iran in the time being. Albeit disagreement with Saudi Arabia, fighting terrorism has become necessity to all.
The Saudi decision to blacklist the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization was remarkable. It is true that it is helpful for Abdel Fattah al-Sissi's Egypt, but it also weakens the Brotherhood movement in Syria. Some even think that keep a string attached between Iran and the Brotherhood may be useful to Saudi Arabia in the end because Tehran can assume the role of a mediator or a pacifier. This would be better if the Iranian-Egyptian entente persists.
It wouldn't have been possible to form the government in Lebanon, then agree on the security plan, and enter once-ago-inaccessible regions like Bab-el-Tabbaneh and Arsal, if it weren't for this relatively positive regional climate.
Former Prime Minister Saad Hariri had himself given the green light to army Chief General Jean Qahwaji before the security plam. One or more phone calls took place between the two men. The movement of terrorism and takfirism has become rejected regionally and internationally. The Saudi decision to combat it, after the many US decisions, leaves no more choices to the Future Movement. Besides, Future Movement itself has started to sense the danger on its future coming from the Takfiri leaders themselves. The Saudi decision has also approached Hizbullah's viewpoint on Takfiris. Nasrallah has just said, "I believe that these steps were affected in a way or another by the Saudi decision." This was said on purpose.
Hizbullah and the rapprochement
Both Iranian and Syrian commands agree on tasking Sayyed Nasrallah with the Lebanese dossier. They accept what he settles on. This is really what happened during the formation of the government. It is true that Najib Mikati was the best in the past two years for the axis Hizbullah belongs to, but President Michel Sleiman had almost turned the table. As soon as Sleiman ventured into endeavors to form the Cabinet, Hizbullah started to sense the danger. The party had then to choose between three options: Whether to face the government with a wide popular and military mobilization in Lebanon, and this was really plausible, or to remain idle, and this was unlikely, or to turn the danger into an opportunity.
Hizbullah is known for its three-plan policy: one against "Israel" that does not change towards any other direction, luckily for Lebanon yet unfortunately for the enemy; a second one to protect all the areas where Hizbullah's supporting milieu is present from Beirut to Dahieh, in the South and in Bekaa; and a third one for Syria.
After the increasing blasts and growing terrorism, it was absolutely necessary to move with the cover of the government. If the Mikati-led government and Hizbullah mobilized, there would have been two risks: falling into the trap of the sectarian strife whose seeds had been sowed by internal and external sides, and exposing the party's liaison and supply routes to closure from Bekaa to the South and Beirut.
It was then deemed mandatory for Future Movement to handle the security decision regarding the regions supporting it. It was then agreed on Nohad Mashnouq to assume the Interior ministry portfolio and on Ashraf Rifi as Minister of Justice. Neither Iran nor Syria intervened in this lineup which seemed as if responding to the US, western, and Saudi efforts. MP Walid Jumblatt played a key role between Tammam Salam, the Americans, and Hariri. Sources close to March 8 camp said that meetings were held in Istanbul. But Jumblatt still denies them.
Those states have won a government that is close to them; and Hizbullah has gained many things as well: its former rivals have sat next to it inside the government; it protected the country from a strife that would have turned into an armed conflict; it spared itself too many explosions; it prevented the transformation of Tripoli into a hotbed of booby-trapped cars; its rivals turned from front leaders and gunmen in Tripoli to wanted and fugitives; and most importantly, the party is still fighting in Syria with the condition of handing its weapons having fallen.
How about the future?
Hizbullah and its allies in Syria and Iran feel that they are winning in these major strategies in the region. Nasrallah and Bashar Assad's statements confirm that. This concurred as the Iranian dossier is making progress. Lebanon is just a detail in this strategy.
The battle is still certainly fierce in Syria. This doesn't go without leaving impact; but the Syrian army and Hizbullah have military givens which corroborate that the balance on the ground is swinging their way day after day. Regaining control on both eastern and western Ghouta is still the chief goal for them. Many takfiri leaders were killed. The battle moved to Qalamoun before finishing with Ghouta. Kassab is to be back sooner or later. Aleppo is a strategic goal expected to be retaken before the presidential polls; but it is still complicated there. Sayyed Nasrallah is convinced that Assad will remain in power and will win the elections. This is important. But the most important is when and how the war will end. There must be a Saudi-Iranian agreement to help the Syrians end the war.
Aoun for presidency?
Hizbullah's decision to support General Michel Aoun to run for presidency is conclusive. This is a political and ethical choice par excellence. General Aoun has stood by Hizbullah and Syria in the most critical times. There cannot be another candidate. Syria supports whoever Hizbullah wants. Syria also recognizes Aoun's support for Damascus after battles with it. But will Future Movement accept this? That is the question of Hizbullah's axis. What can Aoun offer to Saudi Arabi and its allies in counterpart? It is to the General to answer of course. Some are speaking of contacts that are being held away from the limelight conducted by Foreign Minister Gebran Basssil, with US, Saudi and Gulf sides; Hizbullah is in the picture.
If Hizbullah and Future agreed on Aoun, the major breach would have happened. House Speaker Nabih Berri and Hizbullah will never disagree over Aoun despite some divergences in opinion regarding the General. Berri has sent a very positive message to Aoun just recently via the Minister of Education and Higher Learning, Elias Bou Saab. Head of the National Struggle Front, Walid Jumblatt, might approve. The Mount Lebanon region is his key concern. He doesn't want any problem with Aoun. He alluded to this in his interview with al-Hayat newspaper days ago; and now he is in Paris to arrange the future of the presidency.
It is very important to agree over a president before the Parliament session. It is not the votes that really count; it is the prior agreement that does. If there is no agreement, there is no president for Lebanon. Vacuum is possible.
Rifi-Hizbullah
Coordination between Minister of Justice Ashraf Rifi and Hizbullah is on trach, but not everything should be told out loud. Cooperation has scored chief results on the level of the security plan. Both Future Movement and Hizbullah are closely and keenly following up on the army's measures and steps. The Saudi aid for the Lebanese military has been, and so have been the regions where the army must go and the means to comb them with the least damages possible. The miracle of entering Bab-el-Tabbaneh has finally happened. Lines between Hizbullah's office and those of Rifi and Mashnouq are open.
Rifi's ambition is to become prime minister. His rhetoric has become more flexible. Sides close to Hizbullah have sensed this. Some of them explain his former rigorousness as stemming from Hizbullah's refusal to renew his mandate and from his wish to control the front leaders in Tripoli. Mashnouq, for his part, also wants to become prime minister. Both men are lucky. Rifi has built good Arab and international relations. Mahsnouq enjoys a high strategic sense. He keenly follows up on the region's developments. His ties with KSA or at least with some Saudi magnates are more than excellent. His current rhetoric is calm and agreeable. This was crystal clear in his last interview on LBCI.
Can all this happen away from KSA, USA, and the West?
There is a positive climate that has started to echo in Lebanon. There could be fiascos but the positive climate is moving forward towards compromises and agreements. The apparition of Lebanese Forces leader, Samir Geagea, stripped from March 14 forces' direct support after he announced his candidacy to the presidential polls is clear-cut evidence. He embarrassed everybody. The problem now is that if the camp does not support him, the entire movement will be in a contention! What will be left of it if Geagea leaves it after Jumblatt and others?
What does all this mean?
Simply, all this means that the dossiers of Lebanon and Syria are waiting for the Saudi-Iranian contacts to reach a happy end. It seems that is both parties' request. Lebanon can take advantage of this. As to Syria, KSA must accept that there is a new reality. Qatar has gotten that some time ago. Its channels with Hizbullah are good, but they did not lead to anything until now.
Syria, Hizbullah, and Iran may be thinking that Qatar has nothing left to give after the Gulf and Egypt have isolated it and that it is for the best to wait or press for a Saudi shift, especially that the US itself has started to realize that it is impossible to change things by force.
There is no third choice for the region: whether Iranian-Saudi agreements with some international cover, or continuous confrontations that may this time hit targets and spots it did not reach before.
