A New President in May 2014

Johnny Mnayyar - al-Joumhouriya newspaper

There is a general impression equally among the political milieus, the people, and observers, that the absence of the Lebanese state--ever since it was decided to extend the mandate of the Parliament--and the failure of the Prime Minister-designate to assume the cabinet formation mission will last until the date of the election of a new president, due in forthcoming May; noting that presidential vacuum is almost presumed.

The continuous war in Syria and the increasing belief that it would not end any time soon only added to the conviction that there will be vacuum, especially that the western capitals have confirmed that the war in Syria would last for years, after they built their policies at the beginning of the war upon a nearing collapse of the regime.

In addition to the correlation between the Syrian and Lebanese scenes, which makes Lebanon's security stability dependent on the military developments in Syria, the Syrian regime's preoccupation with its home open war shirked its role in the Lebanese presidential elections since 1976--this equation which fastened the Syrian key to the American lock and produced presidents that were mostly depicted as "consensual," except for General Emile Lahoud who came to power to tip the balance with a strong PM, Rafic Hariri.

As Damascus role is deficient, it is clear to the Lebanese that a new regional equation is not crystallized yet, especially amid the absence of decisive results on the level of the conflict in Syria and the broader region.

It is for this reason that the Lebanese political class has become convinced that the breakup of the once-prevailing regional equation--in addition to Washington's concern with the region's complicated dossiers on the level of the Palestinian-Israeli file, the spiraling Iranian-Arab conflict, or Moscow's clout that has emerged through the Syrian gate--only led to postponing the legislative polls and hinted a difficulty to elect a president. Therefore, vacuum at Baabda palace would loiter.
Building on this, disagreement on a government that cannot be born without a certain foreign deal spirals. In fact, the two rival camps in Lebanon-both not ruling out presidential vacuum-look at the government as it will assume its constitutional powers, in addition to the powers of the president of the republic. Moreover, its term will not be determined, or more accurately, its term will be long-lasting and restively full of pivotal decisions.

According to this conviction, the looming disintegration inside the state institutions will pave the way for a new constituent assembly to skim through a new ruling formula that would take into account the developments relevant to the Lebanese reality during and after the civil war.
However, the date of this assembly, to be held under a regional and international supervision, must be set simultaneously with the Syrian solution which will be similar to that reached in Lebanon at the end of the war, that is to say a Syrian Taif [Agreement].
This picture may be spot-on, expect that the events in Syria require an essential modification of this scenario. In fact, unlike all expectations, the Syrian regime has proved its sturdiness, particularly in terms of the military institutions which key configuration remained loyal to the regime.

Furthermore, the chaos that has obfuscated the opposition and the involvement of foreign hardliners seeking to establish an Islamic Emirate or another Afghanistan entailed a modifications of calculus especially that al-Nusra Front managed to take grip of the ground better that the Free Syrian Army.

Therefore, the solution in Syria is still farfetched, especially as the two parties are bracing for Aleppo battle, where the regime seeks to deal a fatal blow and fully control the city, while the opposition seeks some balance by taking over Aleppo.
Thus, unbalance in Lebanon is a dicey option mainly because the upshot of the war is still influencing a lot of political, social, and demographic realities, which threatens a speedy disintegration of the state and the army failure to curb such scenario.

As a consequence, diplomats tasked with the Lebanese dossier see it is mandatory to achieve the presidential elections building on two considerations:

1- Washington is not the only side that seeks to protect the Lebanese state institution from crumbling. Damascus, which does not have any effective gate other than Lebanon, will not take the risk and go to the unknown. Hence, the deterioration of the state is not advantageous to Hizbullah, which clings to keeping the Lebanese legitimacy as its guardian.

2- The second part of the equation may be the "veto" of Hizbullah, which can coordinate with the Syrian regime to assure the birth of a new president of the republic who in turn shall be "consensual."

Diplomatic sources confirm that the search for candidates has kicked off, adding that scrutinizing Hizbullah [depth] may take a little time pending the adoption of a trusted communication channel, supposed to be a Lebanese official one.

Informed sides speak of deliberations over a limited number of "consensual" names, taking into account the required firmness of the next president considering the likely unstable military situation, or the required "experience" in case of an ailing monetary and economic juncture, or maybe the required "diplomatic" flexible side capable of bringing closer the Lebanese categories ahead of the constituent assembly, not to omit the ability to chair the Lebanese "workshop" with all its security, military, economic, monetary and political ramifications, and running it wisely and astutely as deemed necessary by the critical circumstances sweeping Lebanon and the region.