Maneuver of De Facto Cabinet Not Emanating from Void!

Johnny Mnayyar - Assafir newspaper

At first, it seemed that the decision was taken to push things towards a showdown. But not before long, it turned out that what is happening is just a political maneuver and a mere showoff.

Were things decided to descend into confrontation?

Albeit the last speech of Hizbullah Secretary General, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, was strong-worded on both the Lebanese and regional levels, ripostes came to wave confrontation.
Basically, the President of the Republic, whose mandate is to expire next year, directly countered Nasrallah's speech, for the first time throughout his term.

Anyway, Nasrallah's speech came after a series of major developments:

- his revealed visit to Tehran
- the nomination of Tammam Salam to chair the next government
- KSA openness to Hizbullah in Lebanon, with no determined mainstays in that respect
- the real participation of the party in Syria's battles and the change of military forces' balances
- the "Israeli" airstrike in Mount Qasioun.

Building on this, the retorts on Nasrallah's speech, including that of the President of the Republic, were considered as mirroring the stances of western and Gulf capitals.

Undoubtedly, hinting a de facto government very shortly before the formation comes within that same context. Certainly, the "maneuver" of a de facto cabinet did not emanate from the void, with Prime Minister designate, Tammam Salam, having notified all the concerned parties that he would announce the formation of a new government by May 15, and that it might be a de facto cabinet in case agreement was not reached. Nonetheless, House Speaker Nabih Berri had already convened a Parliament session to discuss the Orthodox Gathering proposal, an item he had later withdrawn. Some observers explained this step as alluding the inclusion of an item on extending the mandate of the army chief in the session's agenda.

But the "engagement" axes are also ostensible elsewhere. In fact, contacts are off between Baabda and Ain-el-Tineh. Even more, Berri's itinerants are hearing vehement criticism against the President of the Republic: he only thinks about his own personal interest.

Versus the "maneuver" of a de facto cabinet, some confirm that the House Speaker has considerable cards to play, such as the closure of the Parliament, and the referral to a constitutional text hereby indicating that the President shall consult the Speaker before issuing the new government's decrees. This means that consultations with Berri are binding, even though the results are not.
In counterpart, it is true that Salam has agreed with President Michel Suleiman on some guidelines of the new government, such as the 8-8-8 formula and the distribution of the four sovereign portfolios--whereas the Interior Ministry would be granted to a Sunni, the Defense to a Maronite, the Finance to a Shia, and the Foreign Affairs to an Orthodox--but the political hurdles still abound, on top of which the blocking third.

Salam tried to contain this matter when he vowed to resign immediately if Shia Ministers step down, since the government would be non-consensual. Yet the wide political interests cannot be built upon narrow personal undertakings especially that the President of the Republic clings to naming a Shia figure representing him (General Hennawi). Besides, Salam pledged to resign if the elections did not run, while everything waves an extension of the Parliament mandate.
Accordingly, Salam has declared his commitment that by May 15, he would whether announce a government approved by Hizbullah and the Free Patriotic Movement as per the said guidelines, or announce a de facto cabinet which would depend on the position of MP Walid Jumblatt. If the latter votes confidence, a new government is born.

This is what two wishfully thinking men secretly hope: Saad Hariri and Najib Mikati, while Jumblatt seems more cautious.
Hariri, who had reluctantly agreed to nominate Salam, is aware that extending the mandate of the current Parliament is feasible for two years.

Thus, Hariri implicitly refuses that Salam remains on top of the government for this long, since this would reduce his share of popularity in Beirut. He also believes that Hizbullah is interested in the extension. The equation is hence clear enough to him: he shall assume premiership versus the extension. It seems that there are bets on Hariri as being the only one after Salam capable of granting Hizbullah the blocking third.

From this perspective, Hariri's steps are understandable: opening direct lines with Nasrallah (one meeting took place thus far) and increasing conditions on Salam (not allowing the parties fighting in Syria to partake in the government). But Hizbullah, which is still on the beginning of the contact road with Hariri, vetoes, until now, his return to power.

In turn, Mikati is still betting in his own return to premiership and to the political life, reckoning on Salam's failure and the European support he enjoys, especially from the UK, allowing him to approach KSA.

For his part, Jumblatt seems to be standing on a shaky ground, as he had taken a negatively interesting political path. It was him who toppled Hariri's government, supported Mikati's nomination at the expense of Safadi and Karami, and contributed to turning Mikati against Hizbullah and FPM Ministers.
It was him who lured Mikati into resigning and toppling the government where Hizbullah is the key nerve. It was also him who reneged on his word to Mikati and opted for Salam.

Even though Jumblatt does realize that Lebanon's stability is an international demand, meaning no confrontation with Hizbullah, he is feared to be involved in a new game, where he would be pushing Salam to form a de facto cabinet, which he would not grant confidence, under the pretense of avoiding troubles in the country. All this would be a prelude to pave the way for Hariri's return as the only figure capable of giving Hizbullah the blocking third, besides his necessary presence on top of the government to make others pay the price of their agreement to extend for the Parliament.