The Full Story of Jordan’s involvement in Syria

Al-Akhbar newspaper

For the first three weeks of April, all newspapers and TV stations got suddenly concerned with news and analyses on Jordan's involvement [in Syria]; reports, leakages, and comments, all tailored a considerable story, that is new, surprising, and mysterious.

A Syrian official views Turkish and Lebanese violations and threats against Syria with trepidation, while media overstatedly focused on Jordan's role in Syria and eclipsed the more harmful and serious dangers. Some reports are even throwaway, such as a fresh article in Le Figaro on Jordan's approval to open its air to "Israeli" jets. But "Israel" does not need Jordan's airspace, military wise. Publishing that report was intended to break the "psychological" ice of Jordanians and push them to disconsider cooperation with the US, or even play down Jordan's regime and thrust it into more involvement.

Still, we insisted on knowing the full version of facts on the Jordanian front. What is happening? "Now, almost nothing is happening." Since mid-March, Syrians noticed a quality regression of gunmen and weapons influx from Jordan. Did contacts on the security and military levels between Syria and Jordan have the decisive role in this pacification? Or was it all due to the internal pressures by the popular and national movement-which sternly reacted to Jordan's implication--on the ruling institutions? Or maybe was there a US step back? Was it owing to the achievements of the Syrian army in Damascus countryside, which flatly disrupted a plan to make Daraa a secure zone or a corridor for armed groups to participate in fights? Was it the sum of the aforementioned?

The dimension of military intervention in Syria is debatable, and succinctly reflected on the Jordanian front, which the US has saved for the "last minute," when [supposedly] the regime falls, to prevent power transfer to Jihadi Salafists and secure chemical weapons, or for the moment "a US strategic decision on intervening in Syria" is clinched.

Furthermore, the presence of 200 US troops from intelligence and communication service in Jordan comes under the clause of "preparations for dramatic developments." They settled in Erbed province, contiguous to Syrian borders, but did not position for fight, yet for keeping tabs on the operations zone.
We may here find an answer to why Jordan had closed borders before gunmen and weapons, and even smuggling. US troops' deployment actually does not allow, security wise, unguaranteed mobilizations of Jihadi Salafists. The deployment is rather a pretense which KSA understands, and hence stops pressing ahead to receive armed groups in Jordan and facilitate their move towards Syria.

The beginning of violations

Violations on the Jordanian-Syrian front started in spring 2012, under intensive Saudi pressures, on five levels:

1- Allowing traditional smuggling networks between the two countries to alter smuggled goods, from consumption provisions to KSA-sourced weapons, Kalashnikovs, RPGs, hand grenades, guns, cartridges, anti-aircraft weapons, and anti-tank missiles.
2- Facilitating Arab fighters' smuggling coming from KSA into Syria
3- Shrugging off the infiltration of Jordanian Jihadi Salafists through unsecure border crossings, sparking skirmishes with Jordanian military members "uninformed" of the "shrugging off" decision.
4- Disconsidering, or even implicitly conniving with secrete training camps, established by the Muslim Brotherhood, which worked on training and smuggling Syrian and Arab elements.
5- Training nearly 500 Syrian soldiers and ending the operation by summer 2012.

Why haven't the Syrians revealed these violations? "Because they took place secretly, nay in utter secrecy. And even though they were uncovered by the Syrian army which several times clashed with gunmen, keeping them concealed was a solution complying with the Saudi pressure, in tandem with a balanced political stance on the conflict in Syria."

Damascus had two options: whether to sacrifice, through escalation, Jordan's positive political stance, or to absorb the violations which impact, albeit harmful, remained limited.
Damascus chose to keep the secret, deeming this better on both the political and field levels.

In the beginning of 2013, training Syrian soldiers who fled to Jordan started. The training session was devoted for 5000 members, but only less than 3000 could join it, because most of the military personnel who fled to Jordan were administrative cadres and not fighters. Islamist Libyans, Tunisians, Egyptians, and Sudanese, joined the training.

The intensive US-monitored training ventured into forming special factions trained on street fights, explosions, recruitments, and leading operations. Eventually, 1560 members were trained, geared up with weapons and telecom devises, and sent to Syria as groups to coordinate with local gunmen in Daraa.
These have earlier been to Jordan and met with Jordanian, US, and Saudi officials. They have been bought and recruited to work with the force coming from Jordan and under its command.

In late February, this force managed to reorganize local armed groups and allow them to fight alongside it. It also managed to seize police stations and governmental and party offices. Its salient achievement was gripping the headquarters of the air force battalion command (not the battalion itself) and seizing weaponry. Lastly, the military operation, stepped-up by full data provision from Jordan, managed to impose control on Daraa-the town and a number of neighboring villages, and to turn the international highway leading to Damascus an unsecure way, but without controlling it.

The operation stopped in mid-March, after it was clear that controlling the entire province of Daraa was impossible and that the battle to take over Damascus was unrealistic, considering the preventive measures by the Syrian army in Damascus countryside.

What was the point of Daraa operation?
Two views may answer the question:

1- The possible control of Daraa province until Jordanian borders, which would allow the establishment of a secure zone;
2- Communication with the armed groups expected to lead Damascus battle. However, besides the military hindrances which botched the realization of the operations' strategic goals, "something" has happened and just froze the scene.
In fact, the Syrian command estimates that intervening through Jordan will remain vacillating between the US and Saudi pressures, and the counter popular pressures in Jordan. Amidst the two sorts of pressures at loggerhead, there is a political decision tilting to curb implication, and fearing slithering!