Eye on the Enemy: Will Barak and Netanyahu Attack Iran before Winter?
Next Week: Security Investigation with Shalit Kicks Off
Source: Haaretz
Next week, Gilad Shalit will go through a series of security and intelligence investigations with IDF officials and security system. IDF said that it will be gradual process interrogation, starting with short sessions that are customized to the condition of Shalit, considering the sensitivity of his 5-year captivity.
However, the decision to begin with investigation relies on the good estimates of military mental health officials, who believe that Shalit dealt with his captivity in an astonishing way. In addition, a representative of the Information Security Department Intelligence Division met yesterday Shalit's parents, Noam and Aviva, to coordinate a media policy for sensitive information related to their son and recent events.
After his liberation, Shalit told the doctors who examined his condition that he heard the news expressing fears about his psychological condition, and have realized how much he surprised. During his meeting with President Shemon Peres, at the beginning of the week, Shalit clarified that he is slowly improving.
Will Barak and Netanyahu Attack Iran Before Winter?
Yediot Ahronot - Nahum Barnea
Have the prime minister and defense minister settled on a decision, just between the two of them, to launch a military attack on the nuclear facilities in Iran? This question preoccupies many people in the defense establishment and high circles of government. It distresses foreign governments, which find it difficult to understand what is happening here: On one hand, there are mounting rumors of an "Israeli" move that will change the face of the Middle East and possibly seal "Israel's" fate for generations to come; on the other hand, there is a total absence of any public debate. The issue of whether to attack Iran is at the bottom of the "Israeli" agenda.
It's true that the agenda is loaded with heavy issues: protests are trying to rise again; electricity bills are high; pre-meds are struggling for their right to be independent; Gilad Shalit is out of his house; Ilan Grapel is back - Ouda Trabin is not; a Grad missile is fired on Rishon Lezion: Ahmed El Gaabari and his fellows are our new Palestinian friends, they want to prove for the world and themselves that the aura of glory didn't concern them in the first place: In Gaza they have holidays and what's beyond holidays. All of these issues are substantial and influential but none is pivotal, perhaps that's why it's easy for everyone to be occupied by these issues instead of worrying about confronting the Iranian nuclear weapons. It is easy to understand the difficulties. First and foremost, here are the facts: he who wants to delve into the problem will drown in a sea of technical data only experts understand.
Behind any report about centrifuges, there's a viewer who changed the channel or a reader who preferred playing Sudoku. Second, out of secrecy, the forthcoming information is partial for the sake of who's relating them. Third, out of habit, the audience wasn't allowed to participate in Menachem Begin's decision to hit the nuclear facility in Iraq, as no one has participated in Ihud Olmert's decision (according to foreign sources) to attack the facilities of Syria. Because both attacks were a success, no one complained.
Both attacks involved enormous risks: pilots could have failed to accomplish the mission, could have been captivated and could have caused mass murder; Saddam's regime or Assad's regime could have militarily responded through terrorist attacks or firing missiles; foreign countries like the U.S. could have provoked a crisis. It was very heartening that opponents' disastrous predictions didn't come true, and the attacks were a complete success with no injuries or damages to our groups.
But will it succeed a third time? Yes, say military operation proponents, while opponents say "absolutely not". Iran is a totally different matter; it is state of a different region, regime, culture, atomic project, and of a different risk level.
The political and security commands are divided into different blocs, first one state that the advantages of this military operation are very limited and taking the risk is insane. Iranians will bombard Israel with deadly missiles from Iran, from Lebanon via Hizbullah and from Gaza via Hamas. A regional war will be set off and it will destroy the state of "Israel". It's better for "Israel" to focus on the international group sanctions and hope for the best. Had Iran acquired nuclear weapons, it won't be the end of the world, while an "Israeli" attack just might be.
The second bloc says there's no rush.
They claim that Iranians need at least 2 more years, or two and half to have the project fully developed. Then they will encounter many obstacles. New presidential elections will be taking place in two years, so whether Obama in his second term or a republican in his first term, they will be solely held responsible for the attack of Iran. The regime may change in Iran. Many things can happen in two years.
This week during my stay in Europe, I visited one of the senior U.S. diplomats of a former administration. He said that "Israel" should back renewed negotiations on international inspections as proposed by. But the Iranians are bluffing; all they want is to gain more time. It's clear, he said, but it will be easier for the U.S. and "Israel" to do business when the entire international group publically confesses that the Iranians are deceitful. Some cabinet "Israeli" ministers subscribe to this perception, and they second a military operation as a last resort. They suspect that the growing pressure for an immediate attack stems from "outside motives, whether personal or political." More on that later.
The third bloc includes heads of the armed forces - IDF chief of staff, military intelligence chief, Mossad chief and Shin Bet chief. When the military operation issue was raised in a previous round, people who had occupied these positions respectively were: Gabi Ashkenazi, Meir Dagan, Amos Yadlin and Yuval Diskin. These four strongly refused the military operation. Those who occupy their positions now are: Benny Gantz, Tamir Brdo, Aviv Kochavi and Yoram Cohen. This replacement may have a long-term explanation, and Shalit's deal is an example that draws the attention: Diskin and Dagan both opposed the swap deal; their opposition made the government's positions more radical; while Choen and Brdo approved, and their approval permitted the swap.
But as we know, when it comes to Iran, they share the opinion of their predecessors and are opposed to taking action against Iran at this time. The difference lies in the preparation of the struggle: the predecessors reached negotiations after years of success, and each at his organization enjoyed a firm public status. They looked steadfast and confident. The new ones are less famous, less stern and less experienced.
The way security decisions are made is clear: politician ranks decide and executive ones apply. Refusing orders in not an option neither are the secret gangs. But the procedure is much more complicated than what you learn in civics: the executive rank is an equal partner during the negotiations. It doesn't express his opinions in matters only related to its specialty, but in all the matters. No lines separating both ranks. Actually, the prime minister cannot take a precarious decision if it was objected by the minister of defense, chief of staff, chief of Mossad, and chief of Shin Bet, together or by most of them. He won't dare to, even if he had the support of the mini cabinet majority. He also takes into account that if the operation was a failure, he may be brought before the commission of inquiry, exposed and unprotected, with no document to prove that he had the authorized rank's full support.
That's why it is very important to know how the authorized rank expresses his opinion - does he pound on the table like Maer Dadan used to do or he kindly and calmly restrains; is he an active player in the decision-making process or a puppet serving his superiors. This leads us to the forth bloc - to Benyamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak, the Siamese twin of Iran's case. A rare phenomenon occurs here in the concepts of "Israeli" politics, where the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense work as one Body for one purpose with mutual support and mutual eulogies. This harmony has been made only when one person took both positions. If we insist to dig into history we can cite the rich cooperation between the Prime Minister Shamir and Defense Minister Rabin. And what united them is their despise of Peres.
Both Netanyahu and Barak are being depicted as proponents of the military operation. Netanyahu's thinking, since the beginning of his term, goes like this: "Ahmadinejad is Hitler; if he isn't stopped in time, there will be another Holocaust. There are those who describe Netanyahu's attitude on the matter as an obsession: All his life he dreamed of being Churchill; Iran gives him the opportunity. The popularity he gained as a result of the Shalit deal didn't pacify him: the opposite, it gave him a sense of power."
Barak's motivations are more prosaic and to-the-point: He thinks that just as Israel knocked out the Iraqi and Syrian nuclear facilities in the past, so it must knock out Iran's now: "That's the strategy; that's the tradition."
He figures Dagan's opposition stems from psychological motives: As head of the Mossad, Dagan was credited with extraordinary achievements in jamming up Iran's nuclear project. A military operation so soon after the end of his tenure would diminish the significance of those achievements
Moreover, some cabinet ministers suspect Barak is driven at least partly by personal motives: with no party or constituency behind him. Attacking Iran will be the big bang that will enable Netanyahu to put Barak among the 10 candidates of Likud in the next elections. Thus, he will maintain his position in the ministry of defense. This seems as exaggerated doubt, for Barak doesn't need Ayatollah Khomeini to join Likud, Shalom Samhoun can arrange this in a very peaceful way.
Now of all times, when the sense abroad is that Iran's nuclear progress is slowing, the rumors tell of pressure [in Israel] to act. One of the factors is the weather: Winter is coming, and in winter there are limitations. Others look further ahead: They say that after winter comes spring, and then summer.
Source: Hebrew Press, translated by moqawama.org
Source: Haaretz
Next week, Gilad Shalit will go through a series of security and intelligence investigations with IDF officials and security system. IDF said that it will be gradual process interrogation, starting with short sessions that are customized to the condition of Shalit, considering the sensitivity of his 5-year captivity.
However, the decision to begin with investigation relies on the good estimates of military mental health officials, who believe that Shalit dealt with his captivity in an astonishing way. In addition, a representative of the Information Security Department Intelligence Division met yesterday Shalit's parents, Noam and Aviva, to coordinate a media policy for sensitive information related to their son and recent events.
After his liberation, Shalit told the doctors who examined his condition that he heard the news expressing fears about his psychological condition, and have realized how much he surprised. During his meeting with President Shemon Peres, at the beginning of the week, Shalit clarified that he is slowly improving.
Will Barak and Netanyahu Attack Iran Before Winter?
Yediot Ahronot - Nahum Barnea
Have the prime minister and defense minister settled on a decision, just between the two of them, to launch a military attack on the nuclear facilities in Iran? This question preoccupies many people in the defense establishment and high circles of government. It distresses foreign governments, which find it difficult to understand what is happening here: On one hand, there are mounting rumors of an "Israeli" move that will change the face of the Middle East and possibly seal "Israel's" fate for generations to come; on the other hand, there is a total absence of any public debate. The issue of whether to attack Iran is at the bottom of the "Israeli" agenda.
It's true that the agenda is loaded with heavy issues: protests are trying to rise again; electricity bills are high; pre-meds are struggling for their right to be independent; Gilad Shalit is out of his house; Ilan Grapel is back - Ouda Trabin is not; a Grad missile is fired on Rishon Lezion: Ahmed El Gaabari and his fellows are our new Palestinian friends, they want to prove for the world and themselves that the aura of glory didn't concern them in the first place: In Gaza they have holidays and what's beyond holidays. All of these issues are substantial and influential but none is pivotal, perhaps that's why it's easy for everyone to be occupied by these issues instead of worrying about confronting the Iranian nuclear weapons. It is easy to understand the difficulties. First and foremost, here are the facts: he who wants to delve into the problem will drown in a sea of technical data only experts understand.
Behind any report about centrifuges, there's a viewer who changed the channel or a reader who preferred playing Sudoku. Second, out of secrecy, the forthcoming information is partial for the sake of who's relating them. Third, out of habit, the audience wasn't allowed to participate in Menachem Begin's decision to hit the nuclear facility in Iraq, as no one has participated in Ihud Olmert's decision (according to foreign sources) to attack the facilities of Syria. Because both attacks were a success, no one complained.
Both attacks involved enormous risks: pilots could have failed to accomplish the mission, could have been captivated and could have caused mass murder; Saddam's regime or Assad's regime could have militarily responded through terrorist attacks or firing missiles; foreign countries like the U.S. could have provoked a crisis. It was very heartening that opponents' disastrous predictions didn't come true, and the attacks were a complete success with no injuries or damages to our groups.
But will it succeed a third time? Yes, say military operation proponents, while opponents say "absolutely not". Iran is a totally different matter; it is state of a different region, regime, culture, atomic project, and of a different risk level.
The political and security commands are divided into different blocs, first one state that the advantages of this military operation are very limited and taking the risk is insane. Iranians will bombard Israel with deadly missiles from Iran, from Lebanon via Hizbullah and from Gaza via Hamas. A regional war will be set off and it will destroy the state of "Israel". It's better for "Israel" to focus on the international group sanctions and hope for the best. Had Iran acquired nuclear weapons, it won't be the end of the world, while an "Israeli" attack just might be.
The second bloc says there's no rush.
They claim that Iranians need at least 2 more years, or two and half to have the project fully developed. Then they will encounter many obstacles. New presidential elections will be taking place in two years, so whether Obama in his second term or a republican in his first term, they will be solely held responsible for the attack of Iran. The regime may change in Iran. Many things can happen in two years.
This week during my stay in Europe, I visited one of the senior U.S. diplomats of a former administration. He said that "Israel" should back renewed negotiations on international inspections as proposed by. But the Iranians are bluffing; all they want is to gain more time. It's clear, he said, but it will be easier for the U.S. and "Israel" to do business when the entire international group publically confesses that the Iranians are deceitful. Some cabinet "Israeli" ministers subscribe to this perception, and they second a military operation as a last resort. They suspect that the growing pressure for an immediate attack stems from "outside motives, whether personal or political." More on that later.
The third bloc includes heads of the armed forces - IDF chief of staff, military intelligence chief, Mossad chief and Shin Bet chief. When the military operation issue was raised in a previous round, people who had occupied these positions respectively were: Gabi Ashkenazi, Meir Dagan, Amos Yadlin and Yuval Diskin. These four strongly refused the military operation. Those who occupy their positions now are: Benny Gantz, Tamir Brdo, Aviv Kochavi and Yoram Cohen. This replacement may have a long-term explanation, and Shalit's deal is an example that draws the attention: Diskin and Dagan both opposed the swap deal; their opposition made the government's positions more radical; while Choen and Brdo approved, and their approval permitted the swap.
But as we know, when it comes to Iran, they share the opinion of their predecessors and are opposed to taking action against Iran at this time. The difference lies in the preparation of the struggle: the predecessors reached negotiations after years of success, and each at his organization enjoyed a firm public status. They looked steadfast and confident. The new ones are less famous, less stern and less experienced.
The way security decisions are made is clear: politician ranks decide and executive ones apply. Refusing orders in not an option neither are the secret gangs. But the procedure is much more complicated than what you learn in civics: the executive rank is an equal partner during the negotiations. It doesn't express his opinions in matters only related to its specialty, but in all the matters. No lines separating both ranks. Actually, the prime minister cannot take a precarious decision if it was objected by the minister of defense, chief of staff, chief of Mossad, and chief of Shin Bet, together or by most of them. He won't dare to, even if he had the support of the mini cabinet majority. He also takes into account that if the operation was a failure, he may be brought before the commission of inquiry, exposed and unprotected, with no document to prove that he had the authorized rank's full support.
That's why it is very important to know how the authorized rank expresses his opinion - does he pound on the table like Maer Dadan used to do or he kindly and calmly restrains; is he an active player in the decision-making process or a puppet serving his superiors. This leads us to the forth bloc - to Benyamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak, the Siamese twin of Iran's case. A rare phenomenon occurs here in the concepts of "Israeli" politics, where the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense work as one Body for one purpose with mutual support and mutual eulogies. This harmony has been made only when one person took both positions. If we insist to dig into history we can cite the rich cooperation between the Prime Minister Shamir and Defense Minister Rabin. And what united them is their despise of Peres.
Both Netanyahu and Barak are being depicted as proponents of the military operation. Netanyahu's thinking, since the beginning of his term, goes like this: "Ahmadinejad is Hitler; if he isn't stopped in time, there will be another Holocaust. There are those who describe Netanyahu's attitude on the matter as an obsession: All his life he dreamed of being Churchill; Iran gives him the opportunity. The popularity he gained as a result of the Shalit deal didn't pacify him: the opposite, it gave him a sense of power."
Barak's motivations are more prosaic and to-the-point: He thinks that just as Israel knocked out the Iraqi and Syrian nuclear facilities in the past, so it must knock out Iran's now: "That's the strategy; that's the tradition."
He figures Dagan's opposition stems from psychological motives: As head of the Mossad, Dagan was credited with extraordinary achievements in jamming up Iran's nuclear project. A military operation so soon after the end of his tenure would diminish the significance of those achievements
Moreover, some cabinet ministers suspect Barak is driven at least partly by personal motives: with no party or constituency behind him. Attacking Iran will be the big bang that will enable Netanyahu to put Barak among the 10 candidates of Likud in the next elections. Thus, he will maintain his position in the ministry of defense. This seems as exaggerated doubt, for Barak doesn't need Ayatollah Khomeini to join Likud, Shalom Samhoun can arrange this in a very peaceful way.
Now of all times, when the sense abroad is that Iran's nuclear progress is slowing, the rumors tell of pressure [in Israel] to act. One of the factors is the weather: Winter is coming, and in winter there are limitations. Others look further ahead: They say that after winter comes spring, and then summer.
Source: Hebrew Press, translated by moqawama.org
