Hizbullah had better Intelligence, Strategy, Tactical Command, and Motivation than “Israel”

According to an official "Israeli" military scorecard compiled recently by a top navy officer, Hizbullah had better intelligence information than "Israel" and better control of its forces during the Second Lebanon War.

The article - which was given an award by Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi - was written by Lt.-Col. Robi Sandman, and was published in the latest edition of Ma'arahot, a monthly journal on military issues.

During his research for the article, titled "How the Arabs are preparing for the next war," Sandman asked 24 senior "Israeli" occupation officers to grade the occupation army and Hizbullah in 10 categories, on a scale of 1 to 10.

While the "Israeli" military enjoys superior technology, the scorecard revealed that the army performed poorly in gathering intelligence on Hizbullah, did not command its troops effectively during the month long war and lacked motivation to win.

In intelligence, Hizbullah received a 7 and the "Israeli" occupation forces a 6; in military doctrine and strategy Hizbullah received a 9 and the "Israeli" military a 5; In technology, the "Israeli" occupation received a 9 and Hizbullah a 5; in training and organization, Hizbullah received a 8 and "Israel" 7, and in tactical command Hizbullah received a 8 and the "Israeli" military a 6.

The 24 officers also ruled that Hizbullah had greater motivation to win than the "Israeli" army. Hizbullah received a score of 8 in the motivation category, while the "Israeli" military scored only 4.

In the article, Sandman claims the "Israeli" army is currently structured in a way that it will not be able to prevent thousands of resistance fighters - from Hizbullah or Syria - from infiltrating deep into the Palestinian occupied territories.

The next war, he wrote, will likely include Hizbullah sending hundreds of teams comprised of 4-5 fighters each, armed with anti-tank missiles and sniper rifles, into the "Galilee". "We need to recognize that the "Israeli" army with its current structure cannot provide a response to the unbelievably well-equipped force that is rising up to destroy the State of "Israel"," he wrote.

"These hundreds of squads will be able to rely on local "Israeli"-Arab infrastructure in the Galilee", Sandman wrote. He recommended that the "Israeli" army immediately establish small, elite reconnaissance squads capable of countering this "threat".

Sandman also warned of the possibility that in a future conflict, the United States might not help "Israel" as it had in the past.

Sandman warned of two main reasons for a possible lack of support. The first was what he called the decreasing influence the Jewish community had over the US government. "This trend will continue to get worse, due to adaptation and the fast rise of other minorities, which amount to 30 million people today in the US," he wrote. The second was a possible change in government and subsequent policy that "could leave "Israel" without an ally."

As a result, Sandman recommended that the "Israeli" army ask the US to establish additional warehouses with emergency stockpiles of weaponry in "Israel", even "if "Israel" has to pay for their maintenance."

The US already has several storehouses with weaponry in "Israel". His second recommendation was that "Israel" and the US hold joint training exercises to prepare for the possibility that the "Israeli" occupation army will one day be under "threat" and require American troop support. "This type of support will be important one day in an emergency, but could also serve as a deterrent for enemies when planning an attack," he wrote.