How many missiles will be fired from Iran, Syria and Lebanon against "Israel" in the next war?
Source: Al-Manar TV, 3-7-2008
"Israeli" daily Haaretz reported in its website Thursday that the commander of the "Israeli" Air Force from 1996 to 2000 discussed in a lecture the various future was scenarios.
How many missiles will be fired from Iran, Syria and Lebanon against "Israel" in the next war? This question, as well as the war scenarios, was the subject of an enlightening lecture early in the week by the "Israeli" Major General (res.) Eitan Ben Eliahu.
His lecture surveyed the changes in "Israel's" national security doctrine amid the changing nature of wars, technology and the threats posed by "the country's enemies". The lecture was initiated by an organization established after the Second Lebanon War, when the "Israeli" home front was hit by thousands of Hizbullah rockets.
Eitan Ben Eliahu began his speech by defining the national security doctrine and the changes it has undergone. Since it was formulated in the early 1950s, the concept on exercising military force has advocated the following:
* An initiated war (a preventive strike). But if that is impossible then at least:
* A preemptive strike to disrupt the enemy's war preparations. But if war does break out, the "Israeli" occupation army must conduct a holding operation after which it will go over to Aerial superiority.
* A breakthrough in order to achieve final lines and a defeat of the enemy.
This doctrine outlined a scenario in which "Israel" would find itself at war on two or three familiar fronts (Egypt, Syria and Jordan).
TWO MAJOR LESSONS
According to the "Israeli" security doctrine, the process of defeating the enemy was based on weapons systems that would enable surprise, movement and initiative on the ground. In the air it was based on weapons that would make it possible to attack and destroy airfields and win aerial battles, and on the development of precise weaponry that would destroy ground-to-air missiles.
But from the end of the 1980s, and particularly after the 1991 Gulf War, during which Iraq launched 40 Scud missiles, "Israel" found itself facing new and additional threats:
* Strikes against the home front
* A short warning time (for beginning a war and adding a front)
* A prolonging- of the fighting
* Non-conventional weapons (chemical and nuclear)
Some of these threats became even more acute during the Second Lebanon War and in the Gaza Strip. As a result, "Israel" was forced to increase the security budget sharply, from $35 billion to $50 billion, and to update its national defense doctrine to prepare for scenarios of wars against Iran, Syria, Lebanon and terror with a strategic dimension.
To assess the intensity of these scenarios, Ben Eliahu presented figures from the Second Lebanon War. Hizbullah's missile inventory included about 14,000 missiles. About 4,200 missiles were launched, including about 200 medium-range missiles. The IAF carried out 11,870 sorties during the war's 34 days (an average of 340 sorties a day).
In his estimation, "Israel" must prepare for the next war according to the following script:
* One to three fronts
* Crush the enemy on one front
* Containing the Palestinian front
* Long-range punishment or response (Iran)
WHAT SHOULD "ISRAEL"'S AIM BE IN THE NEXT WAR?
On the basis of the precedent of the Gulf War, Ben Eliahu estimates that in the next war, Syria and Iran might launch between 250 and 300 long-range missiles at "Israel" (Shihab and Scud missiles) and another 5,000 short-range missiles (mainly from Lebanon).
To intercept a single long-range missile, one needs an average of two intercepting missiles and between 500 and 700 missiles in all. In addition, "Israel" must keep another 200 intercepting missiles in reserve. To destroy the short-range missiles, "Israel" will need mainly ground forces.
"Israel" must prepare for a war that will last up to 20 days. Vis-a-vis Syria it must attain aerial superiority and embark on a ground attack for a strategic purpose, attack the missile and launcher sites and attack strategic targets.
ZOOMING IN ON AN AERIAL ATTACK
Vis-a-vis Lebanon, "Israel" has aerial superiority and will therefore have to focus only on an aerial attack against medium-range missiles and carry out a ground attack against short-range missiles.
On the Gaza front, the threat of Qassam rockets and mortar shells is, according to this analysis, "limited, exhausting and indirect," and the response must consist mainly of providing shelters for the civilians, developing more efficient warning and alarm systems - which will be able to identify launched missiles - and launching a ground offensive against the Palestinian guerrillas. And above all "Israel" must grant high priority to development methods for confronting the chemical and nuclear threat.
"Israeli" daily Haaretz reported in its website Thursday that the commander of the "Israeli" Air Force from 1996 to 2000 discussed in a lecture the various future was scenarios.
How many missiles will be fired from Iran, Syria and Lebanon against "Israel" in the next war? This question, as well as the war scenarios, was the subject of an enlightening lecture early in the week by the "Israeli" Major General (res.) Eitan Ben Eliahu.
His lecture surveyed the changes in "Israel's" national security doctrine amid the changing nature of wars, technology and the threats posed by "the country's enemies". The lecture was initiated by an organization established after the Second Lebanon War, when the "Israeli" home front was hit by thousands of Hizbullah rockets.
Eitan Ben Eliahu began his speech by defining the national security doctrine and the changes it has undergone. Since it was formulated in the early 1950s, the concept on exercising military force has advocated the following:
* An initiated war (a preventive strike). But if that is impossible then at least:
* A preemptive strike to disrupt the enemy's war preparations. But if war does break out, the "Israeli" occupation army must conduct a holding operation after which it will go over to Aerial superiority.
* A breakthrough in order to achieve final lines and a defeat of the enemy.
This doctrine outlined a scenario in which "Israel" would find itself at war on two or three familiar fronts (Egypt, Syria and Jordan).
TWO MAJOR LESSONS
According to the "Israeli" security doctrine, the process of defeating the enemy was based on weapons systems that would enable surprise, movement and initiative on the ground. In the air it was based on weapons that would make it possible to attack and destroy airfields and win aerial battles, and on the development of precise weaponry that would destroy ground-to-air missiles.
But from the end of the 1980s, and particularly after the 1991 Gulf War, during which Iraq launched 40 Scud missiles, "Israel" found itself facing new and additional threats:
* Strikes against the home front
* A short warning time (for beginning a war and adding a front)
* A prolonging- of the fighting
* Non-conventional weapons (chemical and nuclear)
Some of these threats became even more acute during the Second Lebanon War and in the Gaza Strip. As a result, "Israel" was forced to increase the security budget sharply, from $35 billion to $50 billion, and to update its national defense doctrine to prepare for scenarios of wars against Iran, Syria, Lebanon and terror with a strategic dimension.
To assess the intensity of these scenarios, Ben Eliahu presented figures from the Second Lebanon War. Hizbullah's missile inventory included about 14,000 missiles. About 4,200 missiles were launched, including about 200 medium-range missiles. The IAF carried out 11,870 sorties during the war's 34 days (an average of 340 sorties a day).
In his estimation, "Israel" must prepare for the next war according to the following script:
* One to three fronts
* Crush the enemy on one front
* Containing the Palestinian front
* Long-range punishment or response (Iran)
WHAT SHOULD "ISRAEL"'S AIM BE IN THE NEXT WAR?
On the basis of the precedent of the Gulf War, Ben Eliahu estimates that in the next war, Syria and Iran might launch between 250 and 300 long-range missiles at "Israel" (Shihab and Scud missiles) and another 5,000 short-range missiles (mainly from Lebanon).
To intercept a single long-range missile, one needs an average of two intercepting missiles and between 500 and 700 missiles in all. In addition, "Israel" must keep another 200 intercepting missiles in reserve. To destroy the short-range missiles, "Israel" will need mainly ground forces.
"Israel" must prepare for a war that will last up to 20 days. Vis-a-vis Syria it must attain aerial superiority and embark on a ground attack for a strategic purpose, attack the missile and launcher sites and attack strategic targets.
ZOOMING IN ON AN AERIAL ATTACK
Vis-a-vis Lebanon, "Israel" has aerial superiority and will therefore have to focus only on an aerial attack against medium-range missiles and carry out a ground attack against short-range missiles.
On the Gaza front, the threat of Qassam rockets and mortar shells is, according to this analysis, "limited, exhausting and indirect," and the response must consist mainly of providing shelters for the civilians, developing more efficient warning and alarm systems - which will be able to identify launched missiles - and launching a ground offensive against the Palestinian guerrillas. And above all "Israel" must grant high priority to development methods for confronting the chemical and nuclear threat.
