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The ‘Israeli’ Crisis of Options in Dealing with Hizbullah

The ‘Israeli’ Crisis of Options in Dealing with Hizbullah
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Jihad Haidar

Once again the ‘Israeli' enemy's military is ruling out the possibility of war in 2017. At the same time, it warns about the possibility of stumbling into a military confrontation that all sides find undesirable. One of its high-ranking officers recently explained how an undesirable military confirmation may occur, telling the American news website, Defense News, that "due to the dynamic of escalation, we might find ourselves in it."


The ‘Israeli’ Crisis of Options in Dealing with Hizbullah

The officer's explanation came in the context of what constitutes scenarios for fighting a war. He highlights three scenarios: both sides want to go to war; one side wants to go to war; or both do not want war. He explained that the most likely scenario involving a probable military confrontation, is one in which both sides do not want a war.

Talk of a scenario involving a confrontation that both sides do not want is theoretically and even practically true, in principle. According to the stances of the ‘Israeli' leadership, the enemy's army is working to maintain a level of readiness that allows it to expand a confrontation in a short period of time. Thus, the concept of rolling toward an all-out confrontation as a result of a localized tactical incident is a work hypothesis upon which the enemy's army builds its abilities and operational plans.

Nonetheless, what the ‘Israeli' officer presented regarding the possibility that the dynamic of escalation might lead to war cannot be accepted unequivocally. In some cases, the will of the two sides can contribute to obstructing a wider confrontation, and this is what happened during more than one face-off between Hizbullah and the enemy's army on the Syrian and Lebanese fronts.

The scenario of rolling toward an all-out confrontation could happen if one of the sides tried to impose limits on the other either politically or militarily, while the other party refuses to succumb and tries to reverse the equation. When the officer is talking about the dynamic of escalation that could lead to a war, he specifically means the possibility that ‘Israel' might try to impose a security equation over Lebanon, which is based on the attempt to expand its attacks in Syria onto Lebanon. That is what it tried to implement in the previous stage, but Hizbullah's responses delivered a message to ‘Israel' helping to understand that any real attempt will be met with proportionate responses. ‘Israel' regressed at that time.

But it seems that the officer starts from the hypothesis that ‘Israel' insists on trying to impose this equation, even if Hizbullah responded, which will lead -according to this theory- to an ‘Israeli' retaliation, and thus rolling toward an all-out confrontation. This scenario is based on an assessment that Hizbullah would not accept or allow the imposition of such an equation. It did not adapt to this attempt in the previous stages. How about now that it's regional status is of a higher stature than before?

In summing up this scenario, the talk about both sides not wanting war becomes accurate, at the start and on condition that the equation it depends on at this stage is preserved.

Moving away from all of the above and excluding the possibility of any of the scenarios, the question should be whether what the officer said regarding this scenario is an expression of a hypothetical estimate that addressed all the scenarios, including the scenario of rolling into a war; a scenario based on indicators; or a result of information about the study of such options.

Thus, the question regarding the estimates the enemy depends on remains uncertain. It leads to the enemy drawing itself into a scenario it does not want in the first place.

In any case, what is constant until now is that the enemy survived not getting involved in a wide confrontation it supposedly does not want. More precisely, it lacks the means to achieve the victory it hopes for.

Furthermore, the officer outlined a set of concepts that might be the basis - even in theory - for any option studied by the decision-makers in Tel Aviv. He explained that the continued arming of Hizbullah raises the possibility of the outbreak of a war against Lebanon, "They haven't stopped for one day their buildup against ‘Israel' ... and we don't want to wait for the first day of the war."

Through these words, the officer reveals the extent of the failure of "the battle between the wars" strategy carried out by ‘Israel' in Syria and targeting the - as the enemy says - balance-breaking quality weapons on its way to Hizbullah. If this policy were indeed successful, ‘Israel' would not have to study alternative options.

This approach also reflects that ‘Israel' finds itself before a crisis of options:
It either remains committed to the current equation, staying regressive and deterred. This means that Hizbullah will become more powerful, either through shoring-up its military capacity and/or through the victories achieved by the resistance axis in Syria that diminished ‘Israeli' hopes for alternative options across the Syrian arena. Or it can initiate an adventure with unguaranteed consequences, but this could lead to ‘Israel' paying a high price. And no one can say for sure how far the confrontation will go.

This is what explains the state of turmoil, hesitation and intimidation that prevails in Tel Aviv as well as the estimates expressed by this officer.

Source: Al-Ahed News

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