10 Years on escaping Lebanon, ’Israel’ Regrets

By Helmi Moussa
Assafir Lebanese Daily, 22-05-2010

While "Israel" is preparing to complete the largest military exercises in its history on the internal front, it feels the growing risks on this front more than ever before, particularly from Lebanon. It is no coincidence "Israeli" leaders and commentators pant and revolve round the number ‘40,000 missiles' they say "Hizbullah" owns, which once reinforced with quality precision missiles form a formidable deterrent to deter the well-known "Israeli" deterrence. Fear of war is no longer a feature found only on one side of the battlefront, it has become evident on both sides, making the eruption of war more difficult than ever.

"Israel's" Emerging Reality
This emerging reality arouses an ongoing dispute among politicians, military officials and commentators in "Israel" over what happened and what led to this situation. Some take this tenth anniversary of the "Israeli" pullout from southern Lebanon in year 2000 as an occasion for an in-depth review of what happened and a harsh appraisal of the self.

Reserve Col. Noam Ben-Zvi, the last of "Israeli" occupation commanders for the Western Sector Brigade in southern Lebanon, recalls in an interview with "Haaretz" newspaper those days, without doubting the nature of what happened ten years ago that "It was not a departure, nor was a withdrawal. It was no more or less than an escape." And Ben-Zvi is the one who oversaw the withdrawal on 24 May 2000, after having led the brigade for almost four years.

2006 war & Bint Jbeil
Bint Jbeil was the town Ben-Zvi used as the centre for his brigade's headquarters, which in the Second Lebanon War (2006) created a significant paradox, as one of the fiercest battles took place round the former headquarters of this Western Brigade. The paradox is that the "Israeli" Army, through returning to the brigade headquarters, wanted to prove its ability to achieve "The picture of victory", but in truth failed to raise the "Israeli" flag and was forced to raise it on top of a nearby house.

Ben-Zvi was among the senior officers who supported the decision of a unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon. He pointed out that some senior officers avoided expressing their opinion. He says "I think Chico Tamir, Samuel Zekai, Aviv Kokhabi, Alon Friedman and Eyal Eisenberg, all of them understood that a pullout is a must. They had all felt they were failing and that continuing their mission in Lebanon was a diminishing option. Many of the high commanders felt this way too. The problem is the higher ranked one is in the 'Israeli' military institution, the more difficult it is to stand against the institution. Hence, it is not surprising the only two commanders who voiced their opinion about the need to withdraw- Generals Amiram Levin and Shai Avital, were dismissed from the army soon afterwards."

An Escape from Lebanon, Not A Withdrawal
Ben-Zvi distinguishes between support for the pullout and method of implementation. In his view, the "Implementation was an operational failure. The 'Israeli' army did not run an extensive investigation into the withdrawal because that would prove many senior officers to have allowed the collapse. They investigated the abduction of soldiers but did not investigate the withdrawal."

Ben-Zvi is not affected by rumors that no soldiers were wounded in the pullout and confirms that the pullout image was interpreted in the Middle East as an "Escape. We left behind equipment and machinery. In many cases, our soldiers looted the equipment... The major humiliation was seen when the men of the South Lebanon Army (SLA) amassed at the Fatima Gate. But this was an unplanned escape during which Hizbullah did not direct heavy fire on us. The soldiers understood this and acknowledged it. There was a waiver of the values we were brought up under as soldiers."

Political commentator Ben Kespit writes in "Maariv" Newspaper under the title "Crying for generations" in an attempt to recall the political circumstances that dictated the implementation of a unilateral withdrawal on the-then new Prime Minister Ehud Barak. He refers to a meeting of the Cabinet held on May 20, 2000 at the "Israeli" Defense (War) Ministry headquarters in Tel Aviv. Barak had promised during the election battle to withdraw "Israeli" troops out of Lebanon within a year. In this time "Hizbullah" started exerting more pressure in the field, and the disintegration process of the SLA began.

Current "Israeli" Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, was the Northern Region Commander at the time when before a Cabinet session convened he took a minister aside to tell him "We must get out now, tonight to be true."
Ashkenazi continued explaining "The security zone could collapse at any moment. The whole deal is on the verge of disintegration, and the SLA understands the situation. This may occur at any second and with it everything will collapse like a tower of cards."

The collapse was not on the cards
During the session the proposal of an immediate departure was raised, but some pointed out that an overnight operation allows for an orderly exit in a military formation. Responsibilities-even if symbolic-would then be transferred to the SLA, thus the "Israelis" can exit with heads held high. Head of the opposition, Foreign Minister David Levy, believed in making contacts within the United Nations and Barak adopted this position not to withdraw under current conditions and to exhaust all political contacts first.

"That was a bad decision, because as of the next day Sunday May 21, the SLA began to crumble. The fact that no organized headquarters were in existence before the pullout, due to Barak's fear of leaks, stirred a sense of uncertainty and despair among the SLA men. They feared ‘Israel' would abandon them in the dead of night (which proved correct), and started seeking a cover for themselves. On Sunday afternoon the first cracks began to widen rapidly. A collapse of SLA posts began. The SLA learned that a domino-effect collapse of their posts could not be stopped. Then soon the entire security zone began to break down. Two days later, between the nights of May23 and 24, the ‘Israeli' army pulled out of Lebanon in a style akin to a terrified escape. With Saturday's exit ‘Israel' missed an opportunity to have a dignified exit. Hizbullah was hitting the exiting forces from the back, which enabled Nasrallah to claim a heroic victory, along with a few hundred resistance combatants succeeded in defeating the greatest army in the Middle East and make them escaped from Lebanon. ‘Israel' reaped the fruits of this turmoil a decade later."

Barak tried to look like a visionary
Kespit indicates that Barak "Tried in the last weeks to grant himself the virtue of the exit and any leadership procedure, vision, or decision making or implementation ability. Yet in reality, the nature of the course was quite the opposite, for Barak had brought a hefty disaster on "Israel." Yes, a pullout from Lebanon was a must, but not this way. Barak's exit from Lebanon, the method of announcing it and the form of its implementation caused all the problems and knocks that befell us in the years that followed. Even Barak's entourage of reporters could not object to all the talk about the place of these events and their place amid historical facts. Barak's announcement in that radio program turned all the cards into losing cards. The truth is he restricted himself to a deadly date. He attempted to score public opinion points, but set himself up in a difficult reality, as the entire Middle East started counting his days. As he assumed his post as PM, the title of the fortress atop a volcano immediately appeared, and as days passed journalists began their weekly columns with a countdown."

Kespit reveals that on the eve of the ‘Israeli' army's pullout, high-level Palestinian sides conveyed "Despondent messages to ‘Israel,' one of them published in these pages in which Abu Alaa, head of the Palestinian negotiating team, said: "'Israel's' unilateral pull out from Lebanon to the international border would be a serious mistake, as it may lead to the outbreak of an Intifada." The Palestinians also said: "How do you expect a remission from us after that? If only a few hundred fighters expelled ‘Israel' out of Lebanon to the international border, how could the Palestinian people accept less than that? After the Sinai precedent, the peace with Jordan and the exit from Lebanon to the last centimeter, it would be inevitable that the Palestinians would expect more. They will be forced to simply stay until the 1967 lines, but no one heeded this message."

The failed face-saving measure Barak attempted
had spoken of an "Agreement", but no one understood which agreement he meant. Kespit reveals that in the end Barak made a poor attempt to present the agreement as a demarcation "deal" with the United Nations. "This was a considerably reactive attempt. Incidentally, the dispute over demarcation continues until today (Just look at the Shibaa Farms). Had Barak thought about the matter before hand, he would have learned about certain appropriate gains he could have made from the withdrawal, part of the boundary line could have been dictated and France may have been secretly used against Lebanon. But Barak, like Ariel Sharon exactly three years after him, preferred a withdrawal. He threw the keys into the air, leaving any gain up for grabs, in his case Hizbullah grabbed them while in Sharon's Hamas did. Who won? Certainly not us."

The ‘within one year' withdrawal deadline he had set caused other damages as well, among them the failure of negotiations with Syria. In January 2000, in Shepherdstown, Barak thought he still had another half year till June and so he did not rush border line talks with the Syrians. For their part, the Syrians were angered and quickly dropped passed concessions they made, mostly ‘Israeli' demands related to security arrangements, water and normalization.

Now, when they wanted to talk about the border line Barak rejected them. He was waiting for "His exit with an agreement" in June. However, the Syrians were enraged and so they blew up the deal. A historic opportunity was missed at once. Had Barrak done the right thing and realised a peace deal with Syria, he would have attached the withdrawal from Lebanon to that deal. They would have been able to twist Hizbullah's arm (when it was still relatively small), raze the ‘axis of evil' between Tehran and Damascus (while it was still relatively weak), silent the northern front (while it was still in its infancy) and isolate Iran. This was to unleash a huge strategic and historic coup in the Middle East and perhaps, current world criticism to any confrontation of Iran's atomic project may not have occurred. But Barak, as we said above, adhered to his time-related principles, statements and schedules. This is what happens when your life runs according to time and clocks rather than to the compass."

Post the escape and the Second Lebanon War
Kespit also addresses discussions that took place in "Israel" on the following day, noting that the debate was practically held between two camps: "One argued that the moment we exit, Hizbullah will become a political party, hence lose its influence and strength. The other side argued the opposite, claiming that no link existed between ‘Israel's' exit and Hizbullah's presence, which in truth was rooted in the continuation of jihad. Hence the link is reversed when Jihad stops the organization weakens and disappears. Those with this belief were very few and were chased out of the flock before the withdrawal. Yet their view soon proved correct, seeing Iran has acquired a valuable post on our northern fence and will not give it up easily. Between years 2000 and 2006 (the Second Lebanon War) Iranian Revolutionary Guard Generals toured our northern fence with field telescopes. Though they are no longer there, but Hizbullah has become closer than ever to having absolute control over Lebanon."

Kespit continues saying "What happened to us in the last decade? Statistically we are saving 25 soldiers each year (The cost of "Israel's" occupation in Lebanon). On the other hand, we paid for that in the number of dead in Lebanon's Second War, others say we paid this toll during the intifada. There were two deadly (five deaths) abductions on the fence also. Hizbullah has transformed from a fringe movement to an organization of great power, dictating policy in Lebanon. Nasrallah besieges the President of Lebanon and controls the House of Representatives and Government. He is the strongest man in Lebanon and Khamenei's representative, holding the management of affairs in his hand."

He concludes that the "Axis of evil controls the region. Should peace be made with Syria and Lebanon, a real agreement be sown with the withdrawal, along with dismantling the northern front, we could have spared ourselves the difficult reality we are witnessing today, where an Iranian division and tens of thousands of rockets at the border are aimed at the heart of Tel Aviv."

Lebanon today is controlled by two powerful arms Syria and Iran. Had ‘Israel' realized a peaceful settlement with Syria, this whole system would not be there, instead the choice of its construction would be just starting, and so would the distribution of cards in the region, the ‘axis of evil' would have been annulled and the peace circle around ‘Israel' would be completed. But none of these occurred instead other bad and very dark things happened, which are nothing compared to what may happen later on, considering the two heroes, Netanyahu and Barak are still in the same position now also."