Back to the South of Syria - Ibrahim Al-Amin

Ibrahim Al-Amin - ‘Al-Akhbar' newspaper

This time, the failure of the attack on Dara'a will have significant consequences on the Western-Arab alliance's workplan against Damascus. The issue is not restricted to yet another failure in securing breakthroughs on the battlefield that would allow full control of the south, rather it has to do with the political, security, and military administration of the last remaining ‘moderate' militant allies of the Saudi-American axis.

What actually happened is that the ‘joint operations room in Jordan, known as ‘MOC' [comprised of American, Jordanian, and Saudi military officers, as well as others from other nationalities], worked during the second half of last year until a few weeks ago, and under direct US supervision, on creating a new reality on the field for the armed groups.

The most important objective of ‘MOC' was to subject all active factions in the region to one unified security and military authority; meaning that about 18 key factions, and the remnants of the ‘Free Army', keeping in mind that the idea of a unified authority is unrelated to the internal working mechanisms of these factions.

This decision made it possible to pave the ground for what they called ‘cooperation' with the ‘Nusra Front', which is powerful in the south. The idea of the ‘MOC' operations room was to focus on making the militants subject to one command in battle, in order for the operations room to take charge of distributing the spoils amongst them.

These efforts were accompanied by wider training operations - deemed ‘qualitative' - for the militants in these groups, within a program aimed at mobilising five thousand trained fighters. These fighters would be tasked with launching the decisive attack to take control of the entire south [of Syria] and reconnecting it with the southern, western, and eastern Damascus countrysides, with the aim of progressing towards the Syrian capital.

This required a higher level of cooperation that involved Turkey this time around so as to deal with the fact that Zahran Alloush, the commander of the ‘Army of Islam', which operates under direct Saudi supervision, would have a decisive role in the battle of Damascus.

However, the well-known workplan, which was referred to as Plan "H", and was uncovered by the Syrian army and its allies, did not achieve its goal. On the contrary, the Syrian army and Hizbullah launched a battle last February to secure a "Protective Edge" for the Syrian capital, which in actuality was to prevent the armed groups from securing any geographic and military link that would facilitate taking control over the areas in the south, and advancement towards Damascus.

This operation enabled military deployment and secured a geographical line of protection, as well as securing control via firepower to prevent the plan to seize the south and the ensuing threat to Damascus.

In practice, the battle of February came to bring about substantial changes to the confrontation. Suffice it to say that, for example, during the period from 31 May 2014 until 31 December 2014, the armed groups lost 1,105 militants [their names are listed along with additional details], and the militants later admitted that 1,215 were killed in the same period. In addition to those killed, there were 3,000 injured, 1,200 of which were treated in the "Israeli" enemy's army hospitals in Occupied Palestine, and the rest in hospitals in Jordan.

It should be of note that the Nusra Front for example, follows a policy of not announcing its death tolls, with the exception of the killing of its leadership cadres. Over the past year, [May 31, 2014 until May 31, 2015] the losses of the militants increased compared to the year before that, reaching 1,977 dead and more than 3,000 wounded.

The ‘MOC' leadership had no other option but to continue with limited military operations aimed at cancelling the results of the "Protective Edge" operation. The militants took control over Basra al-Sham, then thereafter, the headquarters of the 52nd brigade, during which 46 of their fighters were killed. They worked on the eve of that attack and after it, on launching a propaganda campaign that portrays what happened as the achievement that will lead to significant breakthroughs.

Politically, they assumed it would cause the fall of As-Suwayda and all Druze villages, including those in Quneitra; and that it would create a different atmosphere that would allow the achievement of some breakthroughs, whose goals include taking over the city of Dara'a, seizing full control of the Quneitra province, and of course, to reach the Damascus-Dara'a road.

It is definitely in no one's interest to downplay the significance of [the fall of the HQ of] the 52 Brigade, but it should be noted that although this brigade has large numbers, they are deployed throughout all Syrian governorates. What remained in its leadership headquarters, which is located within an area of 3 square kilometers, is a classical formation, known in the army as the ‘rear contingent'. This contingent is not capable of fighting large battles. In addition, the area's surroundings do not facilitate the defense [of the headquarters].

When militants succeeded in infiltrating the HQ, the brigade's forces began redeployment, which involved the withdrawal of all heavy weapons [at the time, Israel's followers in Suwayda said that the army was abandoning the city and its villages]. It later emerged that it was not possible for the armed groups to take over the Tha'lah Central Airport, as it was in actuality subjected to special measures.

As for what the Syrian army and Hizbullah have done in the latest period: They reinforced the points of deployment, pursued the armed groups, and struck several of their ranks. After the movement [of the militants] from the west to Damascus was stopped, militants tried several times to attack Qarfa, al-Faqee', and al-Mahajah. Likewise, the region of Jidyah witnessed epic battles against militant advances.

Finally, after the militants succeeded in achieving breakthroughs in Idlib, Jisr al-Shoghour, and Palmyra, the ‘MOC' operations room began preparing for a major attack in the south. The hope of those in ‘MOC' is that the measures which they undertook achieve great results.

It mobilized several thousand trained fighters with many weapons, in addition to an information network provided by "Israel", in collaboration with Jordan, and Turkish and US intelligence. Furthermore, with additional Saudi and Qatari funding, they began the attack, which they called the "Southern Storm", named after Saudi Arabia's "Decisive Storm" against Yemen.

However, what occurred was that the "securing" measures - that had been greatly improved over the past few months, and which were reinforced after battles near As-Suwayda - enabled the Syrian army and with it Hizbullah, to not only direct heavy blows that foiled the attack, but also struck the collective military leadership of the opposition factions, as well as - through tactical operations - the battlefield commanders, which caused differences between them to come out into the open.

Keeping in mind that the ‘MOC' operations room, which has suffered as a result of these defeats, still insists on carrying out further attacks. There are now attempts to strike the town of Hader in Quneitra once again.

No one who is involved in the battle of the south of Syria believes that things will improve soon. What is certain however, is that the defeat of the armed forces and the high amount of losses in the ranks of their well-trained attack forces, as well as the differences that have strongly re-emerged between the leaders of the military groups, will create a different reality on the ground.

By the way, this new reality will come about in other parts of Syria as well, as all attempts to downplay the battle of Qalamoun will not benefit them in facing what is to come - soon - of special operations aimed at flushing out the terrorists from the remaining areas of the Lebanese-Syrian border.

Source: Al-Akhbar, Translated and edited by website team